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A REMEDY FOR EMPLOYEES, 
OR A SlliELD FOR EMPLOYERS? 
Ruth C. Vance· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Because of the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings, the 
Tailhook incident, and the attention that the media devoted to them_, 
the public is now farniliar with tlie term "sexual harassment." Despite 
fatniliarity with the term, many people remain uncertain about \Vhat 
sexual harassment is. Actually, this offensive workplace activity had 
no label until the mid-l970's.1 Sexual harassment was first defined in 
the mid-1970's by feminist scholars as "unsolicited non-reciprocal 
male behavior that asserts a wotnan's sex role over her function as a . . . 
worker,',2 and as the "unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in 
the context of a relationship of unequal power."3 With these sociolog-
ical definitions of sexual harassment as a foundation, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (''EEOC") developed guidelines in 
the mid-1980's that interpreted Title VIT's ban against sexual discrim-
ination.4 Currently, according to those guidelines, 
[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual ha-
rassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either ex-
plicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employ-
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso Uriiver8ity School of Law. 
I would like to give special thanks to Sue Collins for her editorial assistance. Thanks 
also goes to my research assistants, Lynn Malkowski and ;Jim Kraayeveld, and to my 
secretary, Bonnie Morrison.-
1. See LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARAsSMENT OF WOMEN ON 
nm JOB (1978). 
2. Id. at 14, 15. Although this article could also apply to sexual harassment of men by 
women, women by women.-and men by men, reference will be made to sexual harassment of 
women by men because that is the most pervasive problem. See CA1HERINB A. MAcKINNoN, 
SBXUAL HARAsSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASB OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 28 (1979). 
3. MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 1~ 
4. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.P.R. § 1604.11 (1991). 
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ment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individu-
al is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such 
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unrea-
sonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creat-
ing an intimidating, hQstile, or offensive working environment' 
During the twenty years since sexual harassment was given that label, 
society and the legal system have struggled to define it clearly and to 
deal with it effectively. Most people now know that sexual harass-
ment may occur as an isolated incident or as a continuing, pervasive 
workplace condition.6 Additionally, most people understand that sexu-
al harassment may be verbal or physical, and that it may range from 
suggestive remarks and derogatory co1nments to direct demands for 
sex, and from accidental unwanted touching to physical assault and 
rape.' However, despite the increased attention from legal scholars 
and the media, for most of us, lawyer and non-lawyer alike, the defi-
nition of sexual harassment rem.ains elusive. 
Researchers have raised concerns that sexual harassment is an 
economic issue as well as a personal and legal one. Recent studies 
show that sexual harassment has negative consequences for individu-
als and businesses. 8 Individuals who refuse to accept sexual harass-
ment at work face verbal attacks, lack of cooperation by male co-
workers, poor job evaluations, refusal of promotions, demotions, trans-
fers, reassignment of shifts or hours, denial of job training, impossible 
expectations, and tennination of employment.9 Victims of sexual ha-
rassment also endure high stress levels and may develop anxiety, high 
blood pressure, headaches, and ulcers.10 Sexual harassment in the 
federal workplace cost the govern1nent approxilnately $267 million 
between 1985 and 1987 in the fonn of employee turnover, sick leave, 
and reduced productivity .11 An average Fortune 500 company with 
23,750 employees lost $6.7 million in 1988 because of absenteeism, 
low productivity, and employee turnover connected with sexual ha-
s. /tL 
6. MAcKINNoN, supra note 2, at 2. 
7. See FARLEY, supra note 1, at 15; MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 2; see also Krista 
1. Schoenbeider, A Theory of Tort liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1461-62 (1986). 
8. Kate Stone Lombardi, Seeking to End SU.Ual Harassment, N:Y. 'nMBs, Aug. 23, 
1992, at BWC6. 
9. FARLEY, supra note 1, at IS. 
10. Lombardi, supra note 8, at BWC6. 
11. ItL (citing a 1987 study by the United States Merit Systems Protection Board). 
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rassment.12 
The Hill-Thomas hearings have raised the consciousness of the 
American public regarding sexual harassment and have galvanized 
govern1:nent and business leaders to confront the issue. Since the 
hearings, many sexual harassment victims have come forward, despite 
the personal pain involved in making- a claim.13 Indeed, the nu1nber 
of complaints filed with the EEOC during the first half of this year 
was fifty percent higher than for the same _period last year.14 Quite 
possibly, the Hill-Tho1nas hearings may have given the women who 
were harassed by Navy personnel at the Tailhook convention15 the 
courage to make their clai1ns. Additionally, the manner in which the 
all-male Judiciary Comrnittee. conducted the Hill-Thomas hearings 
prompted an increase in the number of women running for office 
nationwide, giving rise to the 1992 election slogan "Year of the 
Woman."16 
Because sexual harassment law is still in its infancy, predicting 
how courts will apply the law to specific situations and detennining 
what recourse victims have is difficult. Women received their first 
federal statutory protections against sexual discrimination in the 
workplace in the early 1960's from the Equal Pay Act17 and Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 However, the first reported 
case of sexual harassment under Title VII was not decided until 
1974.19 The United States Supreme Court's only case on sexual ha-
rassment was decided in 1986, twenty-two years after Congress enact-
ed Title VII.20 
Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196421 and state 
12. ld. (citing a 1988 survey by WORKING -woMAN magazine). 
13. Michelle Osborn, More Vi~tims Speak Out _After Anita Hill Charges, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 3, 1992, at 4B. , 
14. ld. 
IS. Taillwok Scandal Moves to Courtroom. SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 10, 1992, at 
16~ Hilary MacKenzie, A Political Battle _of the Sexes, MACLEAN's, Sept. 14, 1992, at 
31. 
17. 29 U .. S.C. § 206(d) (1988). The Act states, in relevant part, that ''No employer ••• 
shall discriminate . • • between employees on the basis of sex [by paying unequal wages] for 
equal work on jobs ••• which require equal skill,. effort, and responsibility •••• " ld. 
18. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1988). 
19. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C~ Aug. 9, 1974). 
20. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 51 (1986). As this article goes to press, the 
Supreme Court issued its second opinion on sexual harassment, affirming the hostile _environ-
ment standard that it announced in Merltor. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 
(1993). 
21. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1988). 
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civil rights statutes22 provide equitable remedies for victims of sexual 
harassment, compensatory and punitive damages have not usually 
been available.23 Last year, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
199124 to amend Title vn to allow for such damages. However, em-
ployers with fewer than fifteen employees are exempt, and damage 
caps exist for the employers who are covered.25 Therefore, this 
a1nendment .may not provide adequate remedies to all victims. 
Additionally, if the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Title Vll is 
followed, the statute may not be able to accomplish its purpose of 
elitninating sexual harassment from the workplace.26 In Rabidue, the 
court held that if the workplace was sexually hostile before the plain-
tiff beca1ne an employee, then the employer could not be held liable 
for sexual harassment unless its level increased.27 The court reasoned 
that Title vn was not enacted to change existing workplace condi-
tions. 28 This type of interpretation of Title vn may cause some at-
torneys to bring actions under state civil rights acts. Although some 
courts have criticized Rabidue~29 attorneys may increasingly flle sexu-
22~ See; e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5·1 to 542 (West 1992). 
23. Although most states do not provide compensatory and punitive damages; four states 
do: California. Michigan. Minnesota, and Wisconsin. See infra note 63. 
24. Civil Rights Act or 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended 
at 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1991)). 
I d. 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3). The Act states, in relevant part: 
(3) Limitations. The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded 
under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconve-
nience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and ·other nonpecuniary losses. 
and the amount of punitive damages ·awarded under this section, shall not exceed, 
for each complaining party-
(A) in the case of a respondent who bas more than 14 and fewer than 101 
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding cal· 
endar year, $50.000; 
(B) in the case of a respondent who bas more than 100 and fewer than 201 
,employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding cal-
endar year, $100,000; 
(C) in the case of -a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501 
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the ctnTent or preceding cal-
endar year. $200,000; and 
(D) in the case of a respondent who, has more than 500 employees in each 
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300.000. 
Bills to eliminate the minimum number of employers and the caps on both compensa-
tory and punitive damages have been introduced, but are languishing in committees. S. 17. 
103d Cong .• 1st Sess. (1993); HJt 224, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
26. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 
1041 (1987). 
27. ld. at 620-21. 
28.. Id. 
29. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Philadel-
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al harassment claims in state courts, fearing that federal judges, more 
than one-half of whom have been appointed by a Republican admin-
istration, may take a conservative, pro-employer approach to resolving 
this highly political issue. 
As the law of sexual harassment evolves, attorneys have sought 
to broaden victi1ns' means of redress by using traditional tort theories 
in addition to statutory causes of action.30 Tort claims based on sex-
ual harassment have some advantages that Title vn and sitnilar state 
statutes do not. Plaintiffs suing under tort theories can file their 
claims directly in court \Vithout first having to exhaust their adlninis-
trative remedies as claitnants under Title Vll must do. The typically 
longer statute of limitations on tort actions provides a larger window 
of opportunity to seek relief than does the 180-day deadline for filing 
a clai1n with the EEOC. Attorneys may find that they have fewer 
proof problems in bringing a tort clairn for clients whose relationships 
began consentually than they have if they must prove that the sexual 
harassment was unwelcome under Title vn. Even though the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 provides for compensatory and punitive damages, 
tort clairns are still important to plaintiffs who are employed by em-
ployers with less than fifteen employees and to plaintiffs who face 
caps on da1nages that will not allow full compensation. Furthermore, 
the coverage of the 1991 Act is unclear as to sexual harassment that 
occurred before its passage.31 However, the use of tort law to pro-
vide a remedy for sexual harassment has been accepted by some state 
c.ourts and rejected by others. 
This article begins by tracing the development of sexual harass-
ment claims, both statutory and tort. This article continues by explor-
ing how courts have used workers' compensation law to either allow 
or bar tort claitns based on sexual harassment. This article then con-
cludes that tort actions against employers based on sexual harassment 
phia. 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989). 
30. See generally Alice Montgomery, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A 
Practioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GoLDEN GATB U. L. REV. 879 (1980). 
31. Leon Friedman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Procedural Issues: Retroactivity, 
Changes in Procedures for Attacking Consent Decrees and Seniority Systems; New Limitations 
Periods, C742 ALI-ABA 159 (1992). 
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on two cases, which it bas consolidated, to 
decide whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applies to cases pending on the Act's effective 
date. Landgraf v. USI rtlm Prods., 968 F.2d 427 (Sth Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 
1250 (1993); Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted 
sub nom. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993). 
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should not be barred under the exclusive remedy provisions of 
workers' compensation acts. The 1najor reason not to use workers' 
compensation law to bar tort suits based on sexual harassment is that 
workers' compensation laws do not take into account the strong pub .. 
lie policy against sexual harassment in the workplace and therefore 
should not be allowed to render this policy ineffective.31 Neither 
workers' compensation nor Title Vll was meant to address the indi-
vidual rights violated by acts of sexual harassment.33 Workers' com-
pensation has as its policy the redressing of industrial injuries, and 
the policy of Title Vll is to prevent group discri1nination.34 There-
fore, tort suits are necessary to protect the sexual harassment victim's 
individual rights. 
The availability of tort suits to sexual harassment victims is not 
uniform because of legislators' avoidance of the issue and because of 
varying positions that the judiciary has taken as to its role in inter-
preting the workers' compensation statutes. Legislators have avoided 
the issue because sexual harassment is a political hot potato. Any 
legislative action to clarify workers' compensation acts as they apply 
to sexual harassment will alienate either labor or management. Courts 
that have barred tort suits based on sexual harassment under the ex-
clusive remedy provision have stated that to rule otherwise would 
usurp the legislature's function. On the other band, some courts have 
found it easy to hold that sexual harassment is outside the scope of 
workers' compensation and hence not governed by the exclusive 
remedy rule. Despite the politically controversial nature of this issue, 
state legislatures need to address it instead of leaving it to the courts. 
The author of this article is not suggesting that employers should 
be held strictly liable for sexual harassment if tort suits are allowed. 
Even if the exclusive remedy provision is not used to bar tort actions, 
the agency principles used to deter1nine employer liability limit the 
frequency with which employers can be found liable for sexual ha-
rassment. In the final ·analysis, the most successful lawsuits against 
employers are those for negligent hiring or retention because they do 
not rely on agency principles. However, plaintiffs do deserve the 
opportunity to try to prove their tort claims without the automatic 
barrier of wol'kers' compensation. . 
32. See discussion infra parts IV, V. 
33. See infra pp. 150, 157. 
34. See infra pp. 150, 158. 
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American workers first obtained legal protection from sex dis-
crimination35 by accident.36 Sex discrimination was not included in 
the original draft of Title VII of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 
1964, but was added at the last minute in an effort to prevent pas-
sage of the Act.3·7 Therefore, using legislative history to interpret the 
sex discrimination portion of Title VII is problematic. Although Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex, courts did not initially recognize a cause of 
action for sexual harassment under Title VII.38 Judges did not want 
to hold employers liable for the sexually harassing acts of their em-
ployees,. which the judges viewed as personal in nature.39 Courts 
eventually included sexual harassment under the coverage of Title VII 
by interpreting the language "terms and conditions of employment" 
broadly .4() 
In interpreting the language of Title VII, courts have recognized 
two types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment. In quid pro quo sexual harassment, a supervisor conditions the 
receipt of job benefits on the giving of sexual favors and retaliates if 
the request is denied.41 Hostile environment sexual harassment exists 
35. Ellen F. Paul, Sexual Harassme.nt as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 333 (1990) (tracing the legal developments of sexual harassment as 
a type of sex discrimination). 
36. William L. Woerner & Sharon L. Oswald, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A 
View Through the Eyes of the Courts, 41 LAB. LJ. 786 (1990). 
37. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964). 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(l) provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
(1) to fail or refuse to lUre or discharge any individual, or othenvise to 
discriminate against any -individual with respect_ to compensation, tenns, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ••• sex •••• 
See Garber v. Saxon Business Prod. Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public 
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.NJ. 1976) ("Sexual harassment and sexual· 
ly motivated assault do not constitute sex discrimination under Title VIr') (emphasis in origi .. 
nat), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 P. Supp. 233, 236 
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that Title vn does not impose Uability for a supervisor's sexual 
harassment), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch &. Lomb, Inc., 390 F. 
Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (stating that it is "ludicrous to hold ·that the sort of activity 
involved here [a supervisor's physical and sexual advances] was contemplated by the Act"), 
vacated without op., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). 
39. Paul, supra note 35, at 333. 
40. Id. at 334. 
41. ld. 
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when supervisors or co-workers harass the victim to the point of 
"unreasonably interfering with an individual's work or academic per-
fornlance or creating an intitnidating, hostile, or offensive working or 
academic environment."42 
Initially, courts used the Title VII disparate treatment model to 
recognize quid pro quo sexual harassment as a type of sexual dis-
crimination.43 To have a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment, the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff is a member of 
a protected class; that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harass-
ment; that the harassment was because of sex; that the harassment 
affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and that the 
employer is liable.44 Once the victim establishes a prima facie case 
of quid pro quo sexual harassment, the employer may defend by 
showing that it had a Iegiti1nate reason for its actions. The plaintiff 
then may show that the reason was pretextual.45 To recover, a plain-
tiff must show that she suffered an economic hann from the harass-
ment.46 The courts have adopted the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimi-
nation Because of Sex, which place strict liability on employers for 
quid pro quo sexual harassment by supervisors.47 
Reliance on a risk allocation theory is implicit in the courts' 
holding an employer strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment.48 The courts see employers as the most efficient risk avoiders 
or risk insurers.49 They seek to eradicate sexual harassment by en-
forcing strict liability, creating an incentive for the employer to avoid 
hiring and retaining sexist supervisors. so 
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court held that hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII as a fonn of 
sex discrimination.51 The Supreme Court in Meritor adopted the 
EEOC's Guidelines on Discrirnination Because of Sex as the Guide-
42. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.P.R. § 1604.11 (1991) 
[hereinafter Guidelines]. 
43. Paul, supra note 35, at 338. 
44. See Henson v. City of Dundee. 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982); see also 
Marlisa Vinciguerra, The Aftennath of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the Law of Sexual 
Harassment, 98 YALE LJ. 1717, 1721 (1989). 
45. Hom v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 603 n.l (7th Cir. 1985) .. 
46. Paul. supra note 35, at 341. 
47. Hom, 155 F.2d at 604; 29 C.P.R. § 1604.1l(e) (1984 Amendments). 
48. Paul, supra note 35, at 354. 
49. ld. 
50. Id.; Hom, 155 F.2d 599. 
51. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
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lines relate to hostile environment.52 The hostile environment sexual 
harassment action was modeled after racial hostile environ1nent ac-
tions.53 The Court found that a hostile environment exists under Title 
VII \Vhen harassment reaches a level of severity or pervasiveness so 
as "to alter conditions of employment and create an abusive working 
environment."54 To present a prima facie case for hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment, the plaintiff must show that she is a member 
of a protected group; that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual 
harassment; that the harassment was based on sex; that the harassment 
affected a "term, condition, or privilege of employment," and that the 
employer kne\v or should have known of the harassment and failed to 
take prompt remedial action.55 The Supreme Court in Meritor did not 
make a definitive statement on employer liability for hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment cases, but suggested that lower courts use 
traditional agency principles to make the determination.56 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency imposes liability on the 
employer if the employee's act falls within the scope of employ-
ment.57 Factors that go into determining whether the employee acted 
\Vithin the scope of his employment are the ti1ning and location of 
the sexual harassment, whether it was authorized or foreseeable by 
the employer, and whether it somehow furthered the employer's busi-
ness.58 These agency principles incorporate an individual rights per-
spective regarding responsibility, delegation of responsibility, and 
scope of employment.59 According to the individual rights theory, 
people are free to choose but are responsible for the consequences of 
making those choices.60 People are additionally responsible for the 
consequences of acts delegated to others.61 The use of agency princi-
ples to detennine employer liability in hostile environment cases 
makes recovery against an employer more difficult than in quid pro 
quo cases. 
52. Id. at 57; Guidelines, supra note 42, § 1604. 
53. Paul, supra note 35, at 341 n.37. 
54. Meritor, 411 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 
(11th Cir. 1982)). 
SS. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
56. Meritor, 411 U.S. at 72; Paul, supra note 35, at 354. 
57. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957). 
58. Yates v. AVCO Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987); Paul, supra note 35, at 
354. 
59. Paul, supra note 35, at 355. 
60. Id. 
61. ld. 
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Before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title vn 
remedies were limited to equitable relief such as back pay, injunc-
tions, and reinstatement. 62 Some state employment discrimination 
statutes that use Title vn as a pattern do provide sexual discrimina-
tion victi1ns with compensatory and punitive damages.63 Although the 
pUrpose of Title vn was to remove sexual discrirnination from the 
workplace with respect to compensation, tertns, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, 64 the lhnited remedies did not serve to deter 
employers from allowing sexual discri1nination in the workplace.65 
Further, the lhnited remedies did not make sexual discrimination 
victitns whole,66 which would also serve deterrent purposes. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 allows damages for victhns of 
sexual discrimination.67 However, the monetary limits imposed on 
these damages may prevent some victims from being made whole and 
may mean that larger employers will not be deterred. Additionally, 
those victi1ns who work for employers with fewer than fifteen em-
ployees are still unable to receive compensatory or punitive damages 
under Title Vll. 68 
Plaintiffs have added tort claitns to their Title Vll actions to 
broaden their remedies.69 One comtnentator sees a tort action for 
sexual harassment as having a purpose distinct from a Title vn ac-
tion for sexual harassment because the tort focuses on the victim's 
individual rights rather than on the societal problem of group discrim-
ination, which is the focus of Title Vll.70 These tort suits for sexual 
harassment provide victims with additional avenues for recovery and 
serve as an additional deterrent to employers.71 However, in many 
states such clailns run right into a barrier imposed by the state's 
workers' compensation act.72 
62. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(g) (1964). 
63. Examples are California, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. 
64. See generally Ronald Turner, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Hostile Envl· 
ronment Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Personnel: The Impact and Aftermath of Meritor 
Savings Bank, 33 How. LJ. 1 (1990). 
65. ld. 
66. Id. 
67. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991). 
68. Id. 
69. Paul, supra note 35, at 360-61. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. All states' workers' compensation acts provide that workers' compensation is the 
exclusive remedy for work-related accidents. Many states find sexual harassment to be nn 
accident arising out of and during the course of employment and apply the exclusive remedy 
• 
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ill. TORT ACI'IONS FOR SEXUAL 
Tort actions for sexual harassment allow employees to redress 
wrongs inflicted upon them individually and allow compensation for 
all consequences flowing from the sexual harassment, including pain 
and suffering, emotional da1nages, and general darnages.73 The pur-
pose of a tort action based on sexual harassment is to redress the 
individual's rights to privacy, freedom from sexual assault or the 
threat of it, and freedom from the infliction of emotional distress. 
Tort actions based on sexual harassment, which focus on individual 
rights, supplement Title VTI actions, which focus on remedying group 
discrimination by equalizing opportunities in the tnarketplace. Al-
though a distinct tort of sexual harassment does not exist, the victhn 
of sexual harassment 1nay rely on the torts of negligent hiring, negli-
gent retention, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, 
battery, invasion of privacy, intentional interference with a contractual 
relationship, and fraud and deceit; these torts, with sexual harassment 
as their basis, have been successfully 1naintained.74 
Under the theory of negligent hiring or retention, the employer 
may be held liable for the acts an employee commits outside the 
scope of employment.75 Most other causes of action against employ-
ers rely on agency principles, which require that the employee's tor-
tious act be cotntnitted within the scope of employment. Thus, a suit 
for negligent hiring or retention of an employee who sexually ha-
rassed a co-worker has a greater potential for success than some of 
the other torts listed above because it avoids the employer defense 
that the employee was acting outside the scope of employment and 
therefore not furthering the employer's interests. To have a case for 
negligent hiring or retention, the plaintiff must show that the harasser 
was unfit, considering the nature of the job and the risk that the 
employee posed to those who would foreseeably come into contact 
\Vith hitn; that the employer knew, or should have known, of the 
employee's unfitness; and that the employer's hiring or retention of 
the unfit employee was the proxitnate cause of the injuries.76 The 
rule to bar tort actions for sexual harassment 
73. W. PAGB KEEToN, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEEToN ON nm LAW OF TORTS § 1 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
74. See Montgomery, supra note 30. 
75. RONALD M. GREEN & RICHARD J. REIBSI"E£N, NEGUGENT HIRING, FRAUD, DEPAM'A-
TION, AND OI'HER EMERGING AREAs OF EMPLOYER LIABllJTY 7 (1988). 
76. Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 123-24 (N.C. Ct App. 1986) 
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hiring or retention of the employee is the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries if it is foreseeable that the plaintiff 111ight be 
harmed by the employee.77 This cause of action is appropriate when 
the plaintiff can show that the employer knew or should have known 
that the harasser had a propensity toward, or a history of, sexual 
misconduct. 
Only recently have courts been allowing tort actions for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Historically, courts have 
been reluctant to grant datnages for emotional distress unaccompanied 
by physical impact.78 To recover for intentional infliction of emotion-
al distress, the victi1n must prove actions so shocking and outrageous 
that they exceed all bounds of decency so as to be intolerable in 
civilized society.79 Cotninent E to the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 46 indicates that abusive conduct by a supervisor who has 
real or apparent authority over an employee or who has the power to 
affect the worker's employment may be considered outrageous. 80 A 
supervisor or co-worker's conduct may also be deemed outrageous 
when that person acts despite knowledge that an employee is particu-
larly susceptible to emotional distress.81 Sexually harassing conduct 
should be regarded as outrageous per se under the Restatement defi-
nition.82 In fact, several jurisdictions have recognized actions for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on sexual harass-
ment.83 
Assault and battery have long been recognized as providing a 
(holding the employer liable for sexual harassment if it knew of the co.emptoyee' s tendency 
to engage in such conduct). 
77. /d. 
78. Leslie Hertz Kawalar, Intentional Torts Under Workers' Compensation Statutes: A 
Blessing or a Burden?, 12 HoFSTRA L. REv. 181, 184 (1983). 
79. GREEN & REIBSTEIN, supra note 75, at 37; RBSrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
46(1) (1965). 
80. Employer liability may be found where there is an "abuse by the actor of a posi-
tion, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the 
other, or power to affect his interests." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmL e. 
81. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cml f. 
82. See Montgomery, supra note 30, at 894-95. 
83. See, e.g., Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987) (allowing a sexually ha-
rassed employee to bring an intentional infliction of emotional distress suit because the 
manager's and employer's conduct was not accidental in nature so as to limit the employee's 
recovery to workers' compensation); Pikop v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 390 N.W.2d 743 
(Minn. 1986) (rejecting the employer's defense based on the FELA provisions and finding 
that, because there was a pattern of sexual harassment by her co-workers and supervisor, the 
employer was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress). cert. denied sub nom. 
Burlington N. R.R. v. Gulati, 480 U.S. 957 (1987). 
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remedy for unwanted touching of a sexual nature.84 Therefore, clairns 
for assault and battery are commonly brought by victims of sexual 
harassment.ss An assault claitn is proper where the employee reason-
ably fears unwanted sexual contact.86 A battery claim exists when the 
unwanted sexual contact has occurred.87 
Less co1nrnon theories of tort liability for sexual harassment are 
invasion of privacy, intentional interference with a contractual rela-
tionship, and fraud. Invasion of privacy arises when a person inten-
tionally intrudes upon the privacy or private affairs of another per-
son.88 Plaintiffs must show that the intrusion would be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person. 89 Defendants may avoid liability if they 
prove that they had a legitimate reason to act.90 
A claim of intentional interference with a contractual relationship 
may be appropriate where refusal to give in to sexual demands results 
in retaliation such as termination, demotion, or loss of advancement, 
training, or education.91 When a supervisor interferes with a contrac-
tual relationship through an illegal act such as physical violence or 
fraud, a cause of action exists.92 In addition, a supervisor whose acts 
of sexual harassment become so intolerable that an employee quits 
may also be found to have interfered with a contractual relation-
84. Raefeldt v. Koenig, 140 N.W. 56 (Wis. 1913} (allowing battery suit for touching of 
a sexual nature); · . v. State, 60 Ga. 509 (1878) (allowing battery suit for touching of 
a sexual nature) .. 
85. Davis v. United States Steel Corp., 779 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1985) (allowing claim of 
assault and battery where supervisor's boss witnessed the supervisor touch the plaintifrs but-
tocks without her consent); Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Ct. 
App. 1987) (allowing claim of assault and battery where employee complained to his super-
visors about sexual harassment by a male co-employee, and employer took no action); 
Newsome v. Cooper-WISs, Inc., 347 S.E.2d 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing claim for as-
sault and battery where secretary was fired one month after she complained of unwanted 
touching and rubbing by the comptroller). 
86. Newsome, 341 S.B.2d at 621-22. 
87. Id. 
88. GREEN & REIBSTEIN, supra note 75, at 61; Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., 
Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1532 (11th Cir. 1983) (allowing a claim for invasion of privacy where 
employee's boss repeatedly asked her about her and her husband's sexual practices). 
89. GREEN & REIBSFElN, supra note 75, at 61; Phillips, 711 F.2d at 1533. 
90. GREBN & RBIBSI'BIN, supra note 75, at 61. 
91. Montgomery, supra note 30, at 895; see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 
cmL d (1977) (listing factors relevant in determining whether a cause of action exists). See 
also Favors v. Alco Mfg. Co., 367 S.E.2d 328 (Ga. Ct App. 1988) (existing genuine issue 
of material fact precluded summary judgment on claim that foreman tortiously interfered with 
worker's employment contract by setting in motion her termination because she would not 
accede to his sexual requests). 
92. Fifield Manor v. Fmston, 354 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Cal. 1960). See Montgomery, supra 
note 30, at 896, 897. 
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ship.93 
Theoretically, an action for fraud could be based on sexual ha-
rassment. Perhaps claims for fraud .are not made because of difficul-
ties in proof. To establish a cause of action for fraud, the plaintiff 
must allege that the employer misrepresented material facts, either 
through false representation, concealment, or non-disclosure; that the 
employer knew of the misrepresentation's falsity; that the employer 
intended to induce the plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation; that 
the plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepresentation, and that the 
plaintiff was datnaged because of the reliance.94 Most claims of fraud 
regarding sexual harassment in the workplace would not be based on 
any actual tnisrepresentation, but rather on an implied representation 
of fair treatment and equal opportunity for all employees. A plaintiff 
could argue that the employer impliedly represented that employees 
would be evaluated according to the quality of their work and other 
job-related factors. An employer breaches the implied representation 
of equal opportunity in the workplace when sexual harassment is a 
condition of employment. Another implied representation is that of a 
safe workplace. 95 The employer breaches the implied representation 
of a safe workplace if the employer knew or should have kno\vn of 
an employee's reputation for sexual harassment.96 Proof of these rep-
resentations rnay exist in the employer's brochures, statements of fair 
employment practices, OSHA notices posted at the workplace, and 
employee handbooks.97 An employer Inight also be liable for fraud if 
the employer knows that employees are subjected to sexual harass-
ment by supervisors or co-workers and does not disclose this infor-
mation at the time of hiring.98 
Although prothlsing theoretically, the tort of fraud is difficult to 
prove without actual misrepresentation. Even if actual misrepresenta-
tion exists, if it \Vas oral, fraud will be hard to prove. 
Remedies provided by any of these tort actions supplement Title 
VTI remedies to make the sexual harassment victim whole. But as 
previously mentioned, many state courts never reach the merits of 
93. Montgomery, supra note 30, at 897. 
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS §§ 525, 526, 551(1) (1976). 
95. See Favors, 361 S.E.2d 328 (denying judgment to the employer of a fe-
male who brought ~ claim against her employer for negligently failing to provide a 
workplace free from sexual harassment because the employer should have known of the repu-
tation of its foreman for sexual harassment). 
96. ld. 
97. Montgomery, supra note 30, at 903. 
98. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 551(1) (1976). 
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these tort clai1ns because of the exclusivity of workers' compensa-
tion.99 
IV. WORKERS' COMPENSATION ST~I'UTBS AND CLAIMS 
FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Workers' compensation is one of the oldest for1ns of social in-
surance in the United States.100 The rapid industrialization in this 
nation at the tum of this century caused a dra1natic rise in workplace 
injuries, diseases, and death.101 At that tirne, the cotn•non law pro-
vided that an employer was responsible for an employee's injury or 
death only if the employer was negligent.102 The employer's com-
mon law defenses of contributory negligence, assu1nption of risk, and 
negligent acts of fellow servants presented the injured employee with 
often insurJnountable legal hurdles.103 Even after 1nany states enacted 
laws establishing employer liability for workplace injuries and li1niting 
an employer's use of co1n1non law defenses,104 injured workers still 
had to establish employer responsibility and prove negligence to re-
cover.105 Litigation was an uncertain, ti•ne-consuming, and costly 
process for both the employee and employer.106 
In 1911, a form of no-fault insurance based on the statutory 
scheme of compensation for personal injury and death "arising out of 
and in the course of employment" emerged as a new concept.107 
This no-fault insurance was a swift, sure, and non-litigious system to 
help the injured employee become self-sufficient by replacing lost 
wages and paying medical expenses. 
By 1920, all but eight states had enacted similar laws.108 Today, 
each of the fifty states, American Sa1noa, Gua1n, Puerto Rico, and the 
99. Montgomery, supra note 30, at 906. 
100. 1 ARTHUR LARsON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4.00 (1990). 
101. Id. 
102. UNITED STATES Cfi:M.mBR OF COMMERCE, HISToRY OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
AND EMPLOYERS' LIABR.I1'Y, 1989 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS vii [here-
inafter 1989 ANALYSIS]. 
103. ld. 
104. 1 LARSON, supra note 100, §§ 5.20-.30. 
lOS. Id. § 6.00. 
106. See OFFICB OF FisCAL REviEw, INDIANA LBGISLATIVB SBRVICP.S AGENCY, 6 SUNSET 
AUDIT ON INDUSTRIAL BOARD AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM 71-72 (1987) [herein-
after SUNSET AUDIT]. 
107. 1 LARSON, supra note 100, §§ 6.00-.60 (general discussion on the meaning of "aris-
ing out of the employment''). 
108. Id. § 5.30. 
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Virgin Islands have a workers' compensation system.109 Federal em-
ployees are covered by the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 110 
while both private and public employees in nationwide maritime work 
are covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act.111 
In theory, workers' compensation is really a compromise between 
employers and employees. In the compromise, or quid pro quo 
agreement, employers assume liability for certain occupational dis-
eases, work-related injuries, and deaths, regardless of fault, in ex-
change for a monetary litnit on that liability and the surrender by 
injured employees of any cotnmon law claitns against their employers. 
In return for their surrender of con1mon law claims, making workers' 
compensation the exclusive remedy, injured employees are guaranteed 
monetary benefits regardless of fault 112 Those benefits are not as 
great as a lawsuit verdict might be, but they are certain. In economic 
terms, workers' compensation laws make the economic losses of inju-
ry, death, and occupational disease a business cost that is ultimately 
passed on to consu1ners.113 
In making the quid pro quo arrangement, state legislators intend-
ed to give financial assistance to employees whose injuries resulted 
from workplace hazards and negligence.114 Legislators chose the lan-
guage "arising out of and in the course of employment" to define 
those workplace injuries.115 An employee's injury arises in the 
course of employment if it occurs during the ti1ne and at the place of 
employment while the employee is engaged in employment-related 
activities.116 An employee's injury arises out of the employment if 
there is a causal connection between a risk of the employment and 
the employee's injury.117 These definitions serve as tests to ensure 
that only workplace injuries are compensable under the workers' 
• compensation system. 
109.. 1989 ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at vii. 
110. ld. 
111. ld. 
112. OFFICB OF INSPECI'OR GENERAL, OFFICB OF AUDIT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
D .. W.C.P. SHOULD EVALUATE NONFEDBRAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION TO AsSESS THmR 
ADAPrABn.rrY TO FEI.A: AUDIT REPoRT NO. 02·6-037-09-435 (1988) [hereinafter AUDrr 
REPoRT]. 
113. Deborah A. Ballam, Intentional Torts in the Workplace: Expanding Employee Rights, 
25 AM. Bus. LJ. 63, 76-78 (1987) [hereinafter Ballam, Intentional Torts]. 
114. ld. at 74. 
115. 1 LARSON, supra note 100, § 1.00. 
116. ld. § 14.00. 
117. Id. § 6.00. 
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Remedies are available only to workers whose compensable 
injuries produce disability and affect earning power.118 Remedies 
provided under workers' compensation statutes include disability and 
impairment benefits to compensate for lost earnings and medical 
benefits to restore the injured worker to an optimu111 level of 
health.119 These remedies have the ultimate goal of returning the em-
ployee to gainful employment and a productive position in the com-
munity.120 Workers' compensation benefits, unlike tort judgments, are 
not intended to make the injured worker whole, but to prevent the 
injured worker from becoming a burden on the community.121 For 
example, workers' compensation laws do not provide compensation 
for pain and suffering. As an incentive for the worker to return to 
gainful employment, wage-loss benefits are calculated by statutory 
formulas that generally do not fully compensate the worker for actual 
lost wages.122 Workers' compensation benefits are essentially a tran-, 
sitional support system designed to provide support to injured workers 
until they are rehabilitated and self-sufficient. 
According to the quid pro quo arrangement, if a workplace inju-
ry is found to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, 
workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for the injury, and the 
employer is i•nmune from a suit based .on any other theory .123 An 
employee who has a workplace injury that does not require medical 
treatment or absence from work will not receive any benefits. Not-
withstanding the lack of a rernedy under the workers' compensation 
act, such an employee, in many jurisdictions, is barred from pursuing 
legal action against the employer by the exclusive remedy provision 
of the workers' compensation act. 
Despite the purposes behind the enactment of workers' compen-
sation statutes, many jurisdictions have found sexual harassment to be 
118. Id. § 2.40; see also Kawalar, supra note 78, at 185. 
119. 2 LARSON, supra note 100, §§ 57.10-.11. 
120. Id. § 61.21. 
121. ld. § 2.50; see also Kawalar, supra note 78, at 185. 
122. Income or cash benefits payable under either temporary or permanent disability vary 
significantly between jurisdictions. In many states, these benefits are based on a wage-loss re-
placement percentage. The majority of states use a payment formula that establishes maximum 
weekly benefits in an amount that equals 66%% of that state's average weekly wage 
(SA WW). 1989 ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at 18-20 (Chart VI); see also AUDIT REPoRT, 
supra note 112. 
123. 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, § 65.11; see also Deborah A. Ballam, The- Workers' 
Compensation Exclusivity Doctrine: A Threat to Workers' Rights Under State Employment 
Discrimination Statutes, 21 AM. Bus .. LJ. 95, lOS (1989) [hereinafter Ballam, The En:lusivity 
Doctrine]. 
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a compensable workplace injury.124 Many states that find sexual ha-
rassment to be compensable under workers' compensation acts have 
denied tort actions based on sexual harassment because of the exclu-
. . 
sive remedy provision.125 This denial of a. tort action to sexual ha-
rassment victims usually leaves the employee without a remedy be-
cause most sexual harassment victims have negligible or no medical 
expenses and no lost wages.126 The lack of a suitable remedy for 
sexual harassment under workers' compensation acts may indicate that 
workers' compensation never had as its goal the coverage of sexual 
harassment. 
The goal of fair employment laws such as Title VTI, to ''guaran-
tee equal opportunity in the marketplace,"127 is vastly different from 
the goal of workers' compensation statutes, "to redress industrial 
injuries."128 Providing remedies for sexual harassment is in line with 
the goal of fair employment laws such as Title VII. It is less clear 
that providing workers' compensation coverage for sexual harassment 
on the job fulfills the goal of redressing industrial injuries. Indeed, 
one might ask whether sexual harassment is an industrial injury. Sex-
ual harassment, an injury occasioned by intentional actions in the 
workplace, is not a nor1nal risk of employment. No support can be 
found in early case law for the position that intentional torts were 
considered a nonna1 risk of employment.129 The Supreme Court has 
found that Congress intended Title VII to "supplement, rather than 
supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment dis-
crimination."130 According to the Supreme Court's ruling, Title VII 
should supplement tort actions that would provide remedies for sexual 
harassment.131 Therefore, the exclusive remedy provision of workers' 
compensation statutes should not operate to prevent tort actions that 
would complement Title VTI. 
124. See Lapinad v. Pacific OldsmobUe-GMC Inc., 67') F. Supp. 991 (D. Haw. 1988); 
Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987); Hart v. National Mortgage and I.and Co., 
235 Cal. Rptr. 68, (CL App. 1987); Millison v. B.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 
SOS (NJ. 1985); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); 
Palmer v. Bi-Mart Co., 758 P.2d 888 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). 
125. See cases cited supra note 124. 
126. See cases cited supra note 124. 
' 127. Ballam, The Exclusivity Doctrine, supra note 123, at 98 n.12 (citing Freeman v. 
Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (B.D. Mich. 1979)). 
128,. Id. 
129~ Ballam, Intentional Torts, supra note 113, at 78. 
130. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 4849 (1974); see Ballam, The Ex· 
clusivity Doctrine, supra note 123, at 120. 
131. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47, 48. 
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V. WORKERS' COMPENSATION EXCLUSIVE RE:MEDY DEFENSE 
All state workers; compensation systems provide that workers' 
compensation is the exclusive remedy for employees' injuries as the 
quid pro quo for employers' acceptance of liability regardless of fault. 
The scope of the protection from com1non law tort suits afforded 
employers through the exclusive remedy provision is unclear, as the 
amount of litigation involving the exclusive remedy defense indi-
cates.132 Implicit in the workers' compensation scheme is the notion 
that coverage is provided for the inevitable employee injuries caused 
by negligence or other nortnal hazards of employment. No evidence 
indicates that the legislatures intended the employer to be protected 
from financial ruin arising from workplace injuries caused by some-
thing other than negligence, or a normal hazard or risk of employ-
ment. 133 Nevertheless, the exclusive remedy provision offers great 
protection to employers because most courts and state legislatures 
have interpreted the exclusive remedy provision broadly and have 
created fe\v exceptions.134 Some state legislatures have even reacted 
to judicially created exceptions by passing legislation that narrows 
those exceptions. 135 
The broad interpretation courts have given the exclusive remedy 
provision has left some injured employees without a remedy where 
their \Vork-related injury does not diminish their wage-earning capaci-
ty. A worker in California incurred work-related injuries resulting in 
sexual impotence.136 The worker argued that the exclusive remedy 
provision should not bar his tort suit, because his physical disability 
was not compensable under the workers' compensation scheme.137 
The California appellate court, like many other state courts, 138 ruled 
that \vorkers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for work-related 
132. Arthur Larson devotes a 171-page chapter of his treatise to the exclusivity provision. 
2A LARsoN, supra note 100, §§ 65.00-67.00. 
133. See Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 857 (1982) (holding that the public policy behind workers' compensation does not 
allow employers to protect themselves from liability due to intentional torts). 
134. Ballam, The Exclusivity Doctrine, supra note 123, at 106; see generally 2A LARSON, 
supra note 100, §§ 65.()(M)7.00. 
135. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(A) (Anderson 1986) (overruling Blankenship); 
\V. VA. CODB § 23-4-2 (1985) (overruling Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 
~v. Va. 1.978)). 
136. \Villiams v. State Compensation Ins. Funct 123 Cal. Rptr. 812 (Ct. App. 1975). 
137~ Id. at 815. 
138. See 2A LARsoN, supra note 100. § 65.20 and cases cited therein. 
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injuries even if the resulting disability is not compensable.139 In its 
reasoning, the court pointed to the historic tradeoffs made by the em-
ployer and employee,- and_ stated ~at when the employee received 
protection for loss of earning capacity without fault, he surrendered 
his comnton law right to damages, even those unrelated to earning 
capacity., 140 This reasoning has likewise been applied to tort claims 
based on sexual harassment.141 An Indiana worker who received no 
workers' compensation benefits when she was sexually harassed on 
the job was barred from bringing a tort suit because the court ruled 
that workers' compensation provided her with her exclusive remedy 
even though she received no benefits.142 
The tradeoff that the California appellate court presumed 
benefits to protect eanling capacity in return for _giving up the right 
to sue at com1non law for damages, even those unrelated to eanung 
capacity143 is out of balance. When state legislatures passed the 
workers' compensation schemes, a more equivalent trade \Vas likely 
intended. Indeed, some c_ourts do interpret the quid pro quo to ex-
clude from the exclusive remedy provision -any work-related injuries 
that are not compensable.144 Specifically, in sexual harassment cases, 
some courts have created an exception to the exclusive remedy rule 
for the non-disabling emotional injury brought about by sexual ha-
rassment. 145 
Some state legislatures have tempered the harshness of the exclu-
sive remedy provision with another statutory provision that provides 
for a percentage increase in the injured worker's award when the 
injury results from the employer's "serious and wilful miscon-
duct."146 Courts in states with these penalty statutes face the dilem-
ma of trying to determine whether the legislature intended the penalty 
to take the place of an exception to the exclusive remedy rule_ that 
would allow a common law suit.147 In enacting a penalty provision, 
139. Williams, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 815. 
140. ld. 
141. Fields v. Cummins Employees Fed. Ctedit Union, 540 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. Ct~ App. 
19.89). 
142. Itl. at 637. 
143. Williams, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 8l5. 
144~ 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, §§ 68.30-.36. 
145. See infra_ note 152; see also 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, § 68.34(a). 
146. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 4SS3 (West 1989); MAss. GBN. LAws ANN. ch. 152, § 
28 (\Vest 1988); 1&. RBv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 § S (West 1967 & Supp. 1992);_ see 
2A LARsoN, supra note 100, § 69~10. 
147. E.g., Jobns·Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 612 P.2d 948 
(Cal. 1980); Renteria -v. County of Orange, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) .. 
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a state legislature may have been trying to motivate employers to pro-
vide a safe workplace rather than intending to abrogate the 
employee's right to bring a cotntnon law action.148 Nevertheless, the 
California appellate court pointed out one shortcotning of such a 
penalty provision when it stated that "[ w ]here there is no compensa-
ble injury, 50 percent of nothing is still nothing, and Labor Code 
section 4553 cannot function as a deterrent."149 
Despite courts' and legislatures' broad interpretation of the exclu-
sive remedy provision, a few exceptions have been recognized. Ex-
ceptions have been reco · when the employer acts in a dual 
capacity toward the employee, 150 when the workers' compensation 
act is preempted by a federal act, 151 when the injury is essentially 
non-physical, 152 and when the employer commits an intentional 
tort.153 Dual capacity and preemption arguments have resulted in few 
exceptions. Cases involving non-physical injury or intentional torts, on 
the other hand, have prompted many courts to create exceptions to 
the exclusive remedy rule and will be discussed in detail in the fol-
lowing two sections. 
Under the dual capacity or dual persona doctrine, an employer 
may be liable in tort if the employer possesses a second persona or 
relationship with the employee that i1nposes obligations entirely inde-
p·endent from those obligations related to the. status as an employ-
er.154 The theory behind the dual capacity doctrine is that in the 
quid pro quo agreement, the employee only gave up all rights against 
the employer acting as an employer, but reserved any other rights.155 
The dual capacity doctrine became popular in Ohio and Califor-
nia, especially in products liability cases. In an Ohio case, a truck 
148. 2A LARsoN, suprQ note 100, § 70.10. 
149. Renteria, 147 Cal. Rptt. at 452. Contra Genson v. Bofors-Lakeway, Inc., 332 
N.W.2d 507 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that tort action for damage to bladder was 
barred even though the damage was not specifically compensable under workers' compensa• 
tion). 
150. See, e.g., Douglas v. B. & J. Gallo Wmery, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (CL App. 1977), 
infra note ISS. 
151. See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990), infra notes 167-68 and 
• accompanymg text. 
152. See, e.g., Uvitsanos v. Superior Court, 828 P.2d 1195 (Cal. 1992); infra note 2SS 
and accompanying text. 
153. See, e.g., Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1989), infra 
note 174. 
154. 2A LARSON. supra note 100, § 72.81. 
155. See Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 637 P.2d 266 (Cal. 1981), for the historical 
development of the dual capacity doctrine in California. 
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driver was injured by a blowout of a tire that had been manufactured 
by his employer.156 The court held that the employer had a second 
capacity as a manufacturer and thus could be held liable for manu-
facturing a defective tire.157 The Califonlia appellate court recognized 
the dual capacity doctrine in a products liability case similar to the 
Ohio case. 158 
The California legislature and the Ohio Supreme Court ended the 
use of the dual capacity doctrine after subsequent cases had expanded 
application o.f the rule.159 In California, the legislature eliminated the 
dual capacity doctrine in a 1982 amendment to its labor code.160· In 
Ohio, the supreme court narrowed the dual capacity doctrine by sub-
stituting the term "dual persona.u161 In the Ohio case, a police offi-
cer riding a motorcycle was injured when he drove over a hole in the 
street.162 The court did not allow his lawsuit against the city because 
it found that the employer was not acting in a second capacity that 
created obligations to the employee, independent of its obligations as 
an employer.161 The court held that any second capacity must be so 
independent that it creates a separate legal persona.164 The court rea-
soned that because the streets were the ·police officer's place of em-
ployment, maintaining a safe workplace was not an independent obli-
gation of the police officer's employer.16S Fear of destroying em-
ployer itnmunity by the expansion of the dual capacity doctrine to 
include the employer in capacities such as landowner, land occupier, 
manufacturer, modifier of equipment, vender, vehicle O\vnert and 
156. Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 361 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Ct App. 1977). 
157. ld. 
158. Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery. 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (Ct. App. 1977) (allowing an 
employee to successfully sue his employer when he was mjured from a fall due to the col· 
lapse of an elevator scaffolding device that was manufactured by the employer). 
159. California: D' Angona v. County of Los Angeles, 613 P.2d 238 (Cal. 1980) (extend-
ing doctrine to perntit suits against the employer for medical treatment furnished under com-
pensation law); Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 637 P.2d 266 (Cal. 1981) (applying doctrine 
to employers who assemble a product for their employees' us~ and occasional sale to others). 
Ohio: Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co .. , 378 N.B.2d 488 (Ohio 1978) (extending doctrine to 
permit a suit against the employer for medical treatment furnished under the compensation 
law); Walker v. Mid-States Teraninal, Inc., 477 N.B.2d 1160 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding 
employer liable as a matter of law in its dual capacity as a manufacturer of a hoist even 
though the hoist used in the accident was different from the personal elevators that the em-
ployer manufactured for commercial sale). 
160. CAL. LAB. CODB § 3602 (West 1989). 
161. Freese v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 445 N.E.2d 1110 (Ohio 1983). 
162.. Id. 
163. ld. at 1114, 1116. 
164. ld. 
165. Id. at 1116. 
• 
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health services provider has caused other jurisdictions either to refuse 
to recognize the dual capacity doctrine or to recognize only the nar-
rower dual persona doctrine.166 The rejection of the dual capacity 
doctrine .is an exarnple of the broad interpretation. given the exclu-sive 
remedy provision, which keeps employers largely i1nrnune from suit 
for obligations that they may have toward the employee outside the 
employment ·relationship. 
The United States Supreme Court bas ruled that the exclusivity 
provision is not so broad as to preempt the federal Migrant and Sea-
sonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act.167 In Adams Fruit Co., 
migrant farm workers who were injured in Florida while being trans-
ported in. the employer's van sued the employer under the federal 
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, alleging 
that their injuries occurred because of their employer's intentional 
violations of the Act's motor vehicle safety provisions. The Court 
' ' ' 
held that the Act preempts state law in that it does not pertnit the 
state to supplant the Act's remedial scheme with its own!68 
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court cited a Florida case 
in which the court had refused to apply the exclusivity rule to bar a 
tort action based on sexual harassment in the workplace.169 In the 
sexual harassment case, the Florida Supreme Court had refused to 
apply the role in an extratenitorial manner that would, in effect, have 
derogated the policies of federal and state laws against sexual harass-
ment.rto The Supreme Court in Adams Fruit Co. agreed with the 
Florida Supreme Court's decision not to allow the exclusivity rule to 
limit federal remedies or to create a conflict between the policies of 
federal and state legislation.171 Interpreting the exclusive remedy pro-
vision so expansively that it denies tort actions based on sexual ha-
rassment in the workplace thwarts the strong federal and state public 
policies against sexual discrilnination and harassment that occur in the 
workplace. Therefore, using the reasoning of the Supreme Court in 
166. 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, §§ 72.81 and 72.83 lists Dlinois, Kentucky, Massachu-
setts, Michigan. Minnesota, Missouri, North Dako~ Ohio, Wisconsin, and Florida as recog• 
nizing the narrower dual persona doctrine. The majority of states hold that an employer who 
manufactures, modifies, instaUs, OJ:" distributes_ a product used in work cannot be held liable 
under products liability. See 2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 72 .. 83 n.21 for cases. 
167. Adams Fruit Co. v. Bmett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990). 
168. ld. at 649. 
169. Id. at 647 (citing Byrd v. Ricbardson.Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1102 
(Fla._ 1989)). 
170. Byrd v. Ricbardson.Qreensbields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 1989). 
171. Adams, 494 U.S. at 647. 
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Adams Fruit Co. and the Florida Supreme· Court in Byrd, the exclu-
sive remedy provision should not be applied to· deprive sexually ha-
rassed workers of their rights under state tort law. 
The most widely recognized exception to the exclusive remedy 
provision allows a comtnon law action when the employer conunits 
an intentional tort.172 The intentional tort exception may be a crea-
ture of statute or com•non law. The focus of statutes penalizing an 
employer's intentional misconduct range from the imposition of a 
penalty added to the workers' compensation benefits to the permitting 
of a com1non law suit.173 Jurisdictions vary as to the level of intent 
necessary to warrant an exception to the exclusive remedy provision. 
Some state courts have refused to use the exclusivity provision to bar 
intentional tort actions against employers.174 Several states have used 
the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision to 
allow tort actions for sexual harassment in the workplace~ 115 while 
other states have refused to recognize an exception and bar those 
sarne tort actions.176 
Courts have. relied on public policy in carving out exceptions to 
the exclusive remedy rule so that workers may pursue damages for 
intentional torts. In their decisions, courts have struggled to define the 
lirnits of workers' compensation coverage. Too broad an interpretation 
. ' . 
of the quid pro quo agreement allows workers' compensation systems 
to pre-empt other possible statutory and common law remedies, based 
on equally important policies, that otherwise would be available to 
172. For a discussion of the trend to allow common law actions for intentional torts see 
Kawalar. supra note 78. 
173. The following are examples of states that per1nit a common law action jf the em· 
ployer had an actual intent to produce the injury that occurred: ARIZ. RBV •. STAT. ANN. § 
23·1022 (1983 & Supp. 1991) (common law· suit allowed); CAL. LAB. CODB § 4553 (West 
1989); MAsS·. GEN .. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 28 (West 1988) (100% penalty); OR. RBV. STAT. 
§ 656.156 (1991); WASH. REv •. CODB ANN. § 51.24.020 (West 1990). 
174. Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp .• 890 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding under 
Oregon law that an employer who ordered employees to clean up a PCB spill without pro-
tective clothing may have intended that the employees be injured, and therefore denying the 
employer summary judgment); Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 
Dist.. Ct. App.. 1990) (holding that suit alleging that employer diverted smoke stack so that 
fumes went into workplace not barred); Kennedy v. Panino, SSS So. 2d 993 (La. Ct. App. 
1989) (holding that suit for intentional batteries by employer not barted). 
175. Lapinad v .. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc~, 679 F. Supp. 991 (D. Haw. 1988); Ford 
v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.B~2d 
116 (N.C~ Ct. App. 1986); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 515 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1991); Pursell 
v. Pizza Inn, Inc., 786 P.2d 716 (OkltL Ct. App. 1990). 
176. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Wisconsin 
law); Fields v. Employees Fed. Credit Union. 540 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. Ct. ,App. 
1989); Baker v. Wendy's of Mont., Inc., 687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984). 
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employees. Many courts have decided that the policy of providing 
economic certainty to employers and employees should not be so 
pervasive that it makes the tort law goal of redressing wrongs inflict-
ed upon injured parties177 inoperable. These courts have made excep-
tions to the exclusivity provision in cases of inadequate compensation 
benefits, total non-availability of benefits, and lack of an effective 
deterrefit against the employer, especially when these are accompanied 
by intentional acts of the employer.178 
VI. THE ONAL TORT EXCBPriON TO 'fHB 
EXCLUSIVE Y RULE 
The most egregious intentional tortious conduct occurs when the 
actor intends the injurious consequences of an act. At the other end 
of the continuu1n of tortious conduct is ordinary negligence, which 
consists of a mere risk that a certain consequence will follow. Tort 
scholars generally agree that a person who intentionally acts knowing 
that certain results are substantially certain to follow also conunits an 
intentional tort, 179 albeit not the most egregious type. Most jurisdic-
tions have decided that the exclusivity provision was never intended 
to be used by employers as a shield from liability for intentional 
177. WD.l.IAM PROSSER., LAW OF TORTS at 2 (4th ed. 1971). 
178. Raden v. City of Azusa, 158 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Ct. App. 1979) (allowing a civil action 
for retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim on the grounds that workers' compen-
sation did not "adequately protect'' the worker); Meyer v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local 63-
A, 63-B, 151 Cal. Rptr. 597 (Ct. App. 1979) (allowing a sexual harassment suit for assaul~ 
battery, false imprisonment. and rape, holding that workers' compensation was not the exclu-
sive remedy for assaults committed by the employer's agents); Renteria v. County of Orange, 
147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the exclusivity provision did not bar an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress cJaim based on racial discrimination); see Montgom-
ery, supra note 30, at 910. 
179. "[l]ntent is broader than a desire • • • to bring about physical results. It extends not 
only to those consequences which are desired, but also to those which the actor believes are 
substantially certain to follow from what the actor does.'~ W. PAGE KlmroN BT AL., PRossna 
AND KlmroN ON 11m LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 35 (5th ed. 1984); "As the probability 
that • • • [a certain] consequence will follow decreases, and becomes less than substantially 
certain. the actor's conduct loses the character of intent. and becomes mere reckless-
ness • • • • As the probability decreases further, and amounts only to a risk that the result 
will follow, it becomes ordinary negligence • • • ." RFS'I"ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § SA 
cmt. b (1965); ''Lying between intent to do b~ which • • • includes proceeding with 
knowledge that the ba1m is substantially certain to occur, and the mere unreasonable risk of 
hann to another involved in ordinary negligence, there is a penumbra of what bas been 
called 'quasi-intent.' To this area. the words 4wilful,' 'wanton.' or 'reckless.' are customarily 
applied; and sometimes, in a single sentence, all three." KlmroN, supra note 73. § 34, at 212 
(fooblotes omitted). 
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torts, 180 but conflict exists as to the definition of intentional tort. 
Courts that allow suits for intentional torts against employers 
despite the exclusive remedy rule have used three theories.181 First, 
courts have reasoned that an intentional injury cannot be an accident, 
and therefore workers' compensation coverage was never intended.182 
Second, courts have reasoned that intentional torts are not a normal 
risk of the workplace; therefore, the injury does not arise out of the 
employment relationship and does not meet the test for compensabili-
ty.183 Finally, courts have also found that, at the ti1ne of the inten-
tional tort, the employment relationship is severed, and again, the 
injury does not meet the compensability test. 184 
Jurisdictions draw the line at different p.oints on the continuum 
of tortious conduct in deciding whether to allow intentional tort 
clai1ns for work-related injuries. To support an intentional tort claim 
for a work-related injury, some jurisdictions require a specific intent 
to injure, 185 while others require only that the employer's misconduct 
be wilful and wanton.186 Most states, either by statute187 or case 
law, allow employees to bring suits for intentional torts if the em-
ployee can prove that the employer specifically intended to injure the 
employee, as in the case of assaults.188 Actions for intentional torts 
180. Renteria v. County of Orange, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447, 452 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that 
the exclusivity provision did not bar a tort claim based on racial discrimination); Jablonski v. 
Multack, 380 N.E.2d 924 (Dl. App. Ct. 1978) (preventing an employee who was assaulted by 
a co-employee to recover under workers' compensation law because the co--employee was not 
acting as an alter ego for the employer, stating that workers' compensation law must avoid 
shielding the wrongdoer from liability and reasoning that the legislature would not permit the 
intentional tortfeasor to shift his liability to a fund paid for with premiums collected from 
innocent employers); Copelin v. Reed Tool Co., 596 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (in-
terpreting the state constitution. stating that the legislature does not have the power to deny a 
cidzen the right to resort to the courts for the redress of any intentional injury because that 
right is constitutionally protected). 
181. 2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 68.11. 
182. ld. 
183. ld. 
184. ld. 
185. Lusk v. Monaco Motor Homes, Inc., 775 P.2d 891 (Or. Ct. App. 1989): see 2A 
LARsoN. supra note 100, § 68.13 and cases cited therein. 
186. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.B.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978) (allowing exception 
for tort claims in cases of knowingly maintaining an unsafe workplace in violation of a stat· 
ute or regulation, despite a 1983 amendment to West Virginia's Workmens' Compensation 
Act that overruled the Mandolidis definition of "delibemte intention" as Wilf'ul and reckless 
misconduct); see W. VA. CODB § 23-4-2 (1985); see also Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc., 405 
S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1990) (allowing employee's tort suit for burns under 1983 amendment 
because of a high risk of harm and violation of safety regulations). 
187. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN .. § 23-1022 (1984); MD. ANN. CODB art. 101, § 44 (1979); 
OR. REv. STAT. § 656.156 (1983); WASH. RBv. CODB § 51.24.020 (1984). 
188. 2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 68.11. See Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 
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such as false imprisonment, defa1nation, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress have also been allowed, but usually specific intent 
to injure the employee is necessary.189 Although a fe\v states have 
broadened the scope of the intentional tort exceptio~ to include inju-
ries that are substantially certain to ocqur, 190 Arthur. Larson suggests 
that the exception to the exclusive remedy rule cannot be stretched to 
include the employer's wanton, wi1ful, reckless, or malicious negli-
gence because these acts do not rise to the level of a specific intent 
to cause injury, which is necessary for the injury to lose its acciden-
tal, and hence compensable, character.191 This reasoning is flawed, 
ho\vever, because one can hardly say that a worker's injury \Vas acci .... 
dental when it was caused by the employer's wanton, wilful, or reck-
less conduct. 
Some courts have categorically refused to recognize any inten-
tional act exception to the exclusive remedy rule, no matter what the 
employer's conduct.192 Other courts have either not decided the 
F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding specific intent may be found where workers were ordered 
to clean up a PCB spill without protective clothing); Van Biene v. ERA Helicop~rs, Inc., 
779 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989) (holding a knowing violation of FAA regulations did not consti-
tute specific intent); Briggs v. Pymm Thermometer Corp., 537 N.Y.S.2d 553 (App. Div. 
1989) (concealing dangers fraudulently did not constitute specific intent); Lusk, 775 P.2d at 
895 (failing to supply a supplied-air respirator to worker using hazardous spray paints did not 
constitute specific intent to injure). 
189. 2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 68.11. 
190. Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 444 So. 2d 618 (La. 1984) (allowing action for 
injuries occurring in an explosion and fire because it was substantially certain to occur when 
employer violated safety regulations); VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Prods., 334 N~W.2d 874 
(S.D. 1983) (finding that although it was probable that the employee's injury resulted from 
the design of the employer-manufactured saw, it was not substantially certain). 
191. 2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 68.00. 
192. Buford v. AT & T, 881 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no inten-
tional act exception to the Indiana Occupational Disease Act's exclusivity provi~ion where 
worker was exposed to benzene); Cox v. American Aggregates Corp., 580 N.B.2d 679 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1991) (finding no intentional tort where a welder welded in a poorly ventilated area 
with rods that emitted manganese and chromium fumes, which are known to cause lung 
damage; the plaintiff did not present evidence showing that dle employer intended to injure 
him, and the employer's conduct was at most grossly negligent or wanton): National Can 
Corp. v. Jovanovich, 503 N.E.2d. 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (though baning the injured 
worker's intentional tort action for failure to prove that the employer had the specific intent 
to hann the worker, the court stated that "it would be a tQtal perversion of the humanitarian 
purposes of the Act to peunit an employer to use the Act as a shelter against liability for an 
. . 
intentional tort"); Rajala v. Doresky, 661 P.2d 1251 (Kan. 1983) (finding no exception for an 
intentional tort, the court stated that the exclusive remedy rule is valid even when the em-
ployer conduct is intentionally tortious or culpably negligent, or when the plaintiff is left 
without a remedy); Barber v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., SSS A.2d 766 (Pa. 1989) (holding 
that even if the injured workers could prove that the employers exposed the workers to as-
bestos dust knowing that it would cause disease, the Occupational Disease Act would still 
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question of whether to create an intentional tort exception to the 
exclusive remedy provision, or have not found a set of facts strong 
enough to support finding that an employer specifically intended to 
injure an employee.193 
Courts that have broadened the intentional tort exception have 
done so by refening to the doctrine of "constructive intent" from the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts}94 West Virginia ,and Ohio were two 
of the first states to broaden the intentional tort exception.195 In 
Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.!96 the West Virginia Supreme 
Court interpreted its statute to allow a lawsuit for "wilful, wanton, 
provide the exclusive remedy); Poyser v. Newman & Co., Inc., 522 A.2d 548, SS0-51 (Pa. 
1987) (holding that the Pennsylvania Workmens' Compensation Act bars an injured 
employee's 'intentional tort claim); Parker v. Energy Dev. Co., 691 P.2d 981 (Wyo. 1984) 
(holding that the exclusive remedy rule is absolute and covers even intentional and culpably 
negligent employer conduct); Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984) 
(following this absolute rule to del)y a sexual harassment, suit). 
In Buford, the Seventh Citcuit bel~ based on workers' compensation cases, that no 
intentional act exception exists to the Indiana Occupational Disease Act's exclusivity provi· 
sian. Buford, 881 F.2d at 436. However, the court did recognize the possibility that the Indi-
ana Court of Appeals may find exceptions where the employer has specific intent to injure, 
or where a violent crime has been committed. ld. at 434 (citing National Can Corp. v. 
Jovanovich, 503 N.B~2d 1224 (Ind. Ct App. 1987) and House v. D.P.D., Inc., 519 N.B.2d 
1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)).. Despite the dicta of these cases, the Iildiana Court of Appeals 
for the Third District refused to find physical sexual assault an intentional act sufficient to 
overcome the exclusive remedy rule~ Arrow Unifonn Rental, Inc. v. Suter, S4S N.B.2d 832 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1989). On the other hand. the Indiana Court of Appeals for the FJJ"St District 
relied on the National Can dicta to allow a tort suit based on racial harassment. Perry v. 
Stitzer Buick, GMC, Inc., 604 N.B.2d 613 {IJ1d. CL App. 1992). To clarify seemingly con-
flicting decisions, the question of whether Indiana recognizes an intentional ,tort exception has 
been ,certified to the Indiana Supreme Court by the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana. Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No. 49-S-009309 CQ-1004 
(Ind. Sept. 9, 1993). 
193. National Can Corp., 503 N.E.2d at 1233-34 (fmding evidence insufficient to show 
that employer specifically intended employee's injury when it refused to assign employee to 
. . 
light duty work after he injured his back). 
194. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states: 
Intent is no~ however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor 
knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his 
act and still goes ahead, he is treated by the Jaw as if he bad in fact desired to, 
produce the result. As the probability that the consequences will follow decreases 
and becomes less than substantial certainty. the actor's conduct loses the character 
of intent, and becomes mete recklessness • • • • 
RFSI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § SA (1965); see, e.g., Woodson y. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 
222 (N.C. 1991). 
195. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc~, 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978) (superseded by 
statute as stated in Handley v. Union Carbide Corp., 804 F.2d 265 (4th Cit. 1986)): 
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Cbem., Inc., 433 N.B.2d 572 (Ohio), cert. denied, 459 
u.s. 857 (1982). 
196. 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va.. 1978). 
1993] Workers' Compensation and Sexual Harassment 169 
and reckless misconduct."197 The court stated that employers will be 
found liable if they act with an appreciation of the great risk of phys-
ical harm they have created.198 The legislature overruled Mandolidis 
in 1983 when it modified the supreme court's definition of deliberate 
intent by outlining requirements for a tort action that would allow 
such an action only in aggravated cases of knowingly maintaining 
unsafe workplaces and in cases where the employer has violated 
statutes or regulations. 199 
In Blankenship,Z» the Ohio Supreme Court looked to the Ohio 
Constitution, which establishes the workers' compensation system, to 
the Act's exclusive remedy provision, and to public policy to deter-
mine that employers should not be allowed to escape liability for 
their intentional torts.201 In interpreting the constitutional provision 
that requires liberal construction of the Act to provide broad coverage 
along with the Act's exclusive remedy provision, the court decided 
that the legislature intended to limit employer imrnunity to claims 
based on compensable injuries.202 The court then determined that one 
of the purposes of the Act is to protect employers from tort actions 
based on negligence, but that protecting employers from liability for 
intentional torts would undermine the Act's additional purpose of 
promoting a safe workplace.203 The court also stated that the Act "is 
founded upon the principle of insurance," but that the insurance prin-
ciple does not include shielding employers from liability for their 
intentional torts.~ In a subsequent case, the Ohio Supreme Court 
defined an intentional tort as not requiring a specific intent to injure, 
but requiring only knowledge that harm is a substantially certain 
consequence of the employer's act.205 
In 1986, the Ohio legislature narrowed the court's definition of 
intentional tort.206 The statute allows suits for intentional torts and 
defines an intentional tort as an act committed with the belief that the 
197. Id. at 914. 
198. ld. 
199. W. VA. CODB § 234-2 (1985). 
200. 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1982). 
201. Id. at 575-77. 
202. ld. at 577. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1051 (Ohio 1984) "The actor must know 
or believe that harm is a substantially certain consequence of his act before intent to injure 
will be inferred. The existence of this knowledge or intent Qn the part of the actor may be 
inferred from his conduct and surrounding circumstances.;" ld. 
206. OHIO REv. CODB ANN. § 4121.80(B) (Anderson 1986)~ 
• 
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injury is substantially certain to occur,2117 but the definition of "sub-
stantially certain" states that the employer has to act \Vith "deliberate 
intent'' to cause an employee to suffer an injury.208 By defining sub-
stantial certainty as "deliberate intent," the legislature, in effect, elimi-
nated the substantial certainty test and returned to a specific intent 
• requtrement. 
The West Virginia and Ohio legislatures most likely enacted the 
more restrictive statutes out of a fear that a weakened exclusive reme-
dy doctrine would fail to protect employers from financial ruin from 
large judgments, a major objective of the quid pro quo.209 Although 
judicial decisions in Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia adopting 
either the wilful and wanton misconduct or substantial certainty stan-
dard have been modified by statute, the modifications only narrow the 
application of the judicially set standards rather than abolish them.210 
Indeed, Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia courts have each allowed 
intentional tort suits in cases where there was substantial certainty of 
harm since the legislatures passed their a1nendments to the workers' 
compensation acts.211 These recent cases indicate a trend toward rec-
ognizing the substantial certainty rule. 
Professor Larson is concerned that a broad defmition of inten-
tional tort will erode the no-fault basis of workers' compensation.212 
He begins with the premise that because one of the purposes of the 
workers' compensation system was to mini1nize litigation, all pre-
sumptions should be against allowing lawsuits}13 In deciding ho\V 
207. Omo RBv .. CODB ANN. § 4121.80(0)(1) (Anderson 1986). 
208. ld. 
209. See Ballam, The Exclusivity Doctrine, supra note 123, at 112, 113, 
210. MICH. COMP. LAws § 418.131 (Supp. 1990); 41 Omo RBv. CODB ANN. § 4121.80 
(Anderson 1986); W. VA. CODB § 23-4-2 (1985). 
211. Adams v. Shepherd Prods., U.S., Inc., 468 N.W.2d 332 (Mich. a. App. 1991) (al· 
lowing an intentional tort claim to an employee who lost three fingers while operating a 
. . . 
circular saw from which the blade guard had been removed, where the employer allegedly 
wilfully disregarded the certainty of harm); Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 
1991) {denying the employer's motion for summary judgtllent. holding that it was possible for 
a, jw:y to find that there was a "substantial certainty, that injury would result when safety 
guards were removed from a conveyer belt); Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc •• 405 S.B.2d lS (W. 
Va. 1990) (allowing a restaurant employee who was burned by a container of bot grease to 
collect damages in an intentional tort suit because the court found that there was a high risk 
of haun and that safety regulations had been violated); accord Woodson v. Rowland, 407 
S.B.2d 222 (N.C. 1991) (allowing an intentional tort claim where an employee was killed in 
a trench cave-in, adopting the substantial certainty rule, and finding that such misconduct is 
tantamount to an intentional tort). 
212. 2A LARsoN, supra note 100. § 68.15(e). 
213. ld. 
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intentional torts should fit into the quid pro quo balance, Larson 
states that "unjust" results under the workers' compensation system 
are normal.214 For exatnple, employees who negligently injure them-
selves get benefits.215 He believes that an intentional tort should be 
allowed only if the employer specifically intended the injury, because 
that is the only situation where the injury would be non-acciden-
tal.216 In addition, Professor Larson suggests that specific intent pro-
vides the only bright line rule that would be the least intrusive in 
administering workers' compensation laws.211 
Allowing intentional tort actions under either the specific intent 
to injure standard or the substantial certainty standard does not un-
dennine the tradeoffs of the quid pro quo agreement. Granted, one of 
the purposes of enacting workers' compensation acts was to aninimize 
litigation.218 However, it does not follow that lawsuits should be dis-
allowed at all costs. The no-fault basis of workers' compensation that 
Larson speaks of is a no-fault system only in ter1ns of negligent con-
duct on the part of both employers and employees. Intentional nlis-
conduct, determined under either the specific intent or the substantial 
certainty standard, is not part of the quid pro quo, as evidenced by 
state statutes that disallow benefits in cases of employee wilful Inis-
conduct. Likewise, most states that have addressed the issue allow 
actions against employers for intentional torts.219 Actions should be 
allowed not only when the employer specifically intends the injury, 
but also when an employer's intentional misconduct is substantially 
certain to result in injury, because such misconduct retains the charac-
ter of intent and amounts to more than mere recklessness. Moreover, 
employers should not be able to hide behind the shield of the exclu-
sive remedy provision merely to preserve a convenient, bright-line 
test. 
Larson's characterization of benefits awarded to workers who 
negligently injure themselves as an "unjust'' result is flawed because 
this type of result was intended by the legislators who enacted 
workers' compensation systems. Truly unjust results that were not 
considered in the quid pro quo, which throw it out of balance if 
included, such as an employer avoiding liability for conduct that is 
214. Id. 
215.. /d. 
216. ld. 
217. Id. 
218. See 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, § -68.1S(e). 
219. Id. § 68.15. 
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substantially certain or specifically intended to cause injury, should 
not be accepted as "nor1nal." Furthennore, allowing tort actions in 
cases of intentional wrongs motivates employers to provide a safe 
workplace, an additional purpose of workers' compensation systems, 
and prevents them from using the exclusive remedy provision as a 
shield against liability. 
Allowing tort suits in cases of sexual harassment, cases that 
involve intentional rather than negligent acts, does not undermine the 
quid pro quo, because intentional acts were not a part of the quid pro 
quo. In fact, courts have allowed tort suits based on sexual harass-
ment using both the specific intent and substantial certainty stan-
dards.220 In Ford v. Revlon, Inc., the Arizona Supreme Court used 
the substantial certainty standard to allow an employee to bring an 
intentional tort claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
against her employer.221 In Ford, despite numerous contacts with 
Revlon management, the plaintiff was unable to get Revlon to take 
any action on her complaints of sexual harassment until one year 
after making the first complaint.221 The court classified Revlon's 
conduct as extreme or outrageous223 and found that even though 
Revlon may not have intended to cause the plaintiffs emotional dis-
tress, Revlon's failure to take remedial action made it a near certainty 
that the plaintiffs emotional distress would occur.224 
Oregon's workers' compensation statute contains a provision that 
allows an intentional tort action where the employer has a specific 
intent to injure the employee. In Palmer v. Bi-Mart Co., the plaintiff 
220. Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580. 586 (Ariz. 1987) (relying on intentional nature 
of the corporation's failure to take action when the employee complained of sexual harass-
ment by the manager in allowing the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); 
O'Connell v. Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349, 351-52 (Mass. 1987) (allowing an action against a co-
employee, fmding sexual harassment to be an intentional tort unrelated to the interests of the 
employer); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 120 (N.C. Ct App. 1986) 
(allowing a tort claim against the employer based on sexual harassment, stating that the 
Workers' Compensation Act does not bar a l'lwsuit against the employer for the employer's 
intentional conduct); accord Brown v. Burlington Indus., 378 S.B.2d 232 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1989); Pursell v. Pizza Inn. Inc., 786 P.2d 716, 717 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing a tort 
action based on sexual harassment, finding that the workers' compensation statutes were not 
meant to shield employers ftom ''willful. intentional or even violent conduct,.); Palmer v. Bi-
Mart Co., 758 P .2d 888, 891-92 (Or. Ct App. 1988) (finding an employer's failure to stop 
continuous harassment after being made aware of it sufficient for the Jury to fmd that the 
employer specifically intended to produce the injury). 
221. Ford, 734 P.2d at 585. 
222. /d. at 582-83. 
223. /d. at 585. 
224. [d. 
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complained of her supervisor's sexually harassing conduct for six 
months before the employer attempted to remedy the situation.215 
The Oregon Court of Appeals found those facts sufficient to support 
an inference that her supervisor bad a specific intent to harm her,226 
and a tort action was allowed.227 
The intentional tort exception, although \videly recognized, is 
controversial in terms of the choice of standard and its application. 
As discussed above, both the specific intent test and the substantial 
certainty test have been used to allow tort suits in similar cases of 
sexual harassment. The degree of intent problem can be avoided by 
more properly analyzing on-the-job sexual harassment as being out-
side the scope of the workers' compensation system.228 Workers' 
compensation schemes were enacted to compensate workers for inju-
ries that result from a nor1nal risk of the employment.229 Workers do 
not expect sexual harassment to be a normal risk of the employment. 
Therefore, the exclusive remedy provision of the quid pro quo agree-
ment should not apply to 'bar the sexually harassed employee. 
Allowing employee tort claims based on sexual harassment be-
cause sexual harassment falls- outside the workers' compensation 
scheme also permits actions based on negligence. For example, the 
Ohio Supreme Court found the legislature's narrow substantial cer-
tainty standard inapplicable in a case where the plaintiff alleged that 
the employer "intentionally or negligently maintained a policy of 
. 
encouraging, permitting, or condoning sexual harassment.''230 In al-
lowing the tort action, the court held that in light of Ohio's public 
policy against sexual harassment on the job, forcing victitns of 
workplace sexual harassment to meet a strict intent test in order to 
sue the employer when the workers' compensation system fails to 
provide a true remedy for sexual harassment contravenes the public 
policy against sexual harassment.231 
In su1n, sexual harassment is an intentional act, and as such can 
provide the basis for an exception to the exclusive remedy rule., Torts 
based on sexual harassment have been allowed under both the specific 
225. Palmer v. Bi~Mart Co, 758 P.2d 888, 889·90 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). 
226. ld. at 891. 
227. It! at 892. 
228. See Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 587, 589-90 (Ariz. 1987) (Feldman,, J., 
concurring). 
229. See 1 LARSON, supra note 100, § 6.00; see also Hart v. National Mortgage & l.and 
Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73 (Ct. App. 1987). 
230. Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428, 430 (Ohio 1991). 
231. IlL at 435. 
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intent and substantial certainty standards, but the whole problem of 
the degree of intent can be avoided by focusing on the core issue of 
compensability. Sexual harassment is not an accident and is not a 
normal risk of employment; hence, sexual harassment is outside the 
scope of the workers' compensation system. Furthermore, the lack of 
a meaningful remedy for sexual harassment within the workers' com~ 
pensation system points to the necessity of allowing tort actions so as 
not to thwart the public policy against sexual harassment. 
Vll. THE NATURE OF 1'HR INJURY AND WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION COVERAGE 
Another factor courts have used to detennine whether to allow a 
tort suit is the nature of the injury. Courts have recognized the exclu-
sive remedy defense to a tort clairn only if the nature of the injury is 
such that it is covered under the act.232 Traditionally, if the injury is 
non-physical, then there is no compensation coverage and a tort suit 
is allowed.233 Non-physical injuries that may give rise to tort actions 
such as invasion of privacy, fraud, deceit, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress do not come within the basic coverage criteria of 
"personal injury by accident."214 
Focusing on the nature of the work-related injury in deciding 
whether to allow a tort action has led to anomalous results. The Cali-
fornia courts have dealt with this issue in a series of cases. In 1978, 
232. 2A LARsoN, supra note 100. § 65.40. 
233. ld. 
234. ld. § 68.30; Hamilton v. East Ohio Gas Co., 351 N.B.2d 775 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973) 
(stating that finding an intentional tort to be an ''injury" is difficult because of the accidental 
quality of the term "injury'' in a suit against a woman's employeJ' and co-employees for false 
imprisonment, invasion of privacy, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
Arthur t .arson supports the physical versus non-physical harm distinction and states, 
[l]f the essence of the tort • • • is non·physical, and if the injuries are of the 
usual non-p}lysical sort, with physical injury being at most added to the list of 
injuries as a makeweight, the suit should not be barred. But if the essence of the 
action is recovecy for physical injury or death • • • the action should be barred 
even if it can be cast in the fonn of a nonnally non·physical tort. 
2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 68.34(a). 
Professor I...arson's statement would seem to support allowing tort actions based on 
sexual harassment because sexual harassment does not normally result in significant physical 
injury. However, Professor Larson's approach would probably bar tort suits based on sexual 
harassment that result in physical injury, both under the nature-of-the-injury test and under his 
bright line specific intent standard for allowing intentional tort exceptions. Using these tests 
would create the potential for greater recovery to those who sustain solely psychological 
damage. 
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the California Court of Appeals allowed a tort action for a county 
employee \vho alleged intentional racial harassment.235 In Renteria v. 
County of Orange, the plaintiff brought a clahn for intentional inflic~ 
tion of emotional distress that did not result in a disabling physical 
injury.136 The court distinguished this case from a non-compensable, 
non-disabling physical injury, such as impotence, which is non-com-
pensable only because it does not affect wage-earning capacity.231 
The court held that the intentional harassment was in a "class of civil 
. ' . . 
\vrongs outside the contemplation of the workers' compensation sys-
tem."238 The court further reasoned that a civil suit had to be al-
lo\ved to provide the employee with a remedy and the employer with 
a deterrent.239 
In 1987, the California Supreme Court distinguished Renteria and 
barred a plaintiff's action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.240 In Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District, a firefighter, 
who was subjected to continual harassment by the assistant chief, 
developed hypertension and eventually had a disabling stroke.241 In 
barring his tort action, the court stated that if the tort clai1n had not 
been allo\ved in Renteria, the plaintiff would not have had a reme-
dy .241 The court found that the firefighter had a physical disability 
that was compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.243 The 
court refused to find an intentional tort exception to the exclusivity 
rule, stating that evaluations and personnel decisions were inherently 
intentional, a normal risk of employment, and therefore covered under 
the Workers' Compensation Act.244 The court did not adopt the rul~ 
ing in Renteria that intentional harassment belonged to a ''class of 
civil \vrongs outside the contemplation of the workers' compensation 
system."245 The court used the nature-of-the-injury test even though 
it recognized the possibility that an employee who has suffered emo-
tional distress without a resulting physical injury could recover dam-
ages, \vhile an employee who has suffered a physical injury in com-
235. Renteria v. County of Orange, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Ct. App. 1978). 
236. ld. at 451. 
237. Id. 
238. ld. 
239. Id. at 451-52. 
240. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist, 729 P.2d 743, 747 (Cal. 1987). 
241. Id. at 744. 
242. I d. at 747. 748. 
243. Id. at 744, 750. 
244. ld. at 750. 
245. I d. at 747. 
• 
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bination with emotional distress, which is usually a more reprehensi-
ble injury, would be limited to workers' compensation benefits.246 
Two months after the California Supreme Court used the nature-
of-the-injury test in Cole, the California Court of Appeals decided to 
abandon the test when it allowed an employee, who alleged both 
physical and mental injuries, to bring a suit for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, negligent retention, and assault and battery 
based on homosexual harassment.247 The appellate court pointed out 
the anomalous results that can occur under the nature-of-the-injury 
test that the Cole court had recognized.248 The court also discussed 
the difficulty of separating physical and mental damages, and the 
difficulty of deciding which one is dominant at the pre-trial stage.249 
The court replaced250 the physical versus non-physical harm distinc-
tion with inquiries as to whether the acts were a "nonnal part of the 
employment relationship"251 or were "incidents of the employment 
relationship."252 These factors were also used by the Supreme Court 
in Cole.253 Professor Larson states that if a court abandons the na~ 
ture-of-the-injury test, workers' compensation will become a less 
exclusive remedy as the seriousness of the injuries increases.254 
However, abandoning the nature-of-the-injury test may be necessary to 
avoid anomalous results. In fact, distinguishing between physical and 
non-physical injuries is contrary to the purpose of workers' compen-
sation to provide benefits for reduced wage-eanling capacity. To 
achieve results that are internally consistent and consistent with the 
p-urpose of workers' compensation, the inquiry must be focused on 
public policy and the inherent risks of employment. 
Recently, the California Supreme Court reconciled the courts' 
analysis in Renteria and Cole.255 While agreeing with the result that 
246. ld. 
247. Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73 (Ct. App. 1987). 
248. ld. at 73, 74. 
249. ld. at 73. 
250. In Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 885 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit 
followed the nat'UnW>f-the-injury test enunciated in Cole. The court stated that the court of 
appeals in Hart was powerless to abandon the supreme court's test and substitute the "normal 
part of the employment relationship" test. 
251. Hart, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (citing Cole v. Fair Oaks Fll'e Protection Dist., 729 P.2d 
743, 750 (Cal. 1987)). 
252. Hart. 235 Cal. Rptr. at 73 {citing Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 
612 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1980)). 
253. Cole, 129 P.2d at 750, 751. 
254. 2A LARsoN, supra note 100) § 68.34(d). 
255. Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 828 P.2d 1195 (Cal. 1992). 
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the court of appeals reached in Renteria, the supreme court suggested 
that the court of appeals erred in stating that emotional injury that 
results in \Vork-related disability is not compensable.256 The supreme 
court would not tolerate the anomalous results guaranteed by using 
the nature-of-the-injury test and found that regardless of whether an 
injury is physical or non-physical, the injury is compensable if it 
affects wage-earning capacity.257 The supreme court added that if the 
employer's conduct contravenes funda1nental public policy or exceeds 
the inherent risks of employment, then workers' compensation will 
not be the exclusive remedy.258 
Focusing on the nature of the work-related injury has also led to 
conflicting results in sexual harassment cases. A civilian Army em-
ployee brought a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claitns Acf-59 for 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from 
sexual harassment.260 She did not clain1 any physical injuries.261 In 
allowing the tort suit, the Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Employ-
ee Compensation Act, which provides workers' compensation to fed~ 
eral employees, compensates government employees for physical 
injury only.262 Presu1nably, a tort suit alleging physical ha•n1 would 
be barred. 
T\VO Florida Court of Appeals cases decided the same day barred 
assault, battery, negligent hiring and retention, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claims based on sexual harassment.263 Both 
cases involved a battery of unwanted touching that resulted in mental 
injury.264 In each decision, the court interpreted the statutory defini-
tion of "accident," which states that "mental or nervous injury due to 
stress, fright or excitement only . . . shall be deemed not to be an 
injury by accident arising out of the employment."265 The court 
found that the emotional distress claim in each case was not "due to 
fright or excitement only," but was caused by a battery.266 In 
256. Id. at 1202 .. 
257. Id. at 1201-02. 
258. Id. at 1202. 
259. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988). 
260. Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1990). 
261.. ld. at 1169. 
262. ld. at 1174. 
263. Schwartz v. Zippy Mart, Inc., 470 So. 2d 720 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985); Brown v. 
Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 469 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Ct App. 1985). These cases were subse-
quently Qverroled in Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989). 
264. Schwartz, 470 So. 2d at 721; Brown, 469 So. 2d at 158. 
265. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(1) (West 1991). 
266. Brown, 469 So. 2d at 158; Schwartz, 470 So. 2d at 722. 
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Schwartz, the court added that the touchings were more than technical 
batteries.267 Even the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
in Brown was barred.268 The court stated that the label placed on the 
tort was irrelevant because all the tort claims were based on the im-
pennissible touching.269 The fact that the Workers' Compensation 
Act provided the plaintiffs with no remedy was irrelevant to the 
court. 270 As Judge Ervin's partial dissent points out, if the sexual 
harassment had been accomplished without physical contact, then the 
conduct would not have been covered by the Workers' Compensation 
Act, and the common law suit would not have been barred.271 
Whether the physicaVnon-physical distinction is made regarding the 
manner of sexual harassment or regarding the type of injury caused 
by sexual harassment, making such a distinction leads to inconsistent 
decisions on the allowance of tort suits. 
In sexual harassment cases, most courts have not relied on the 
physical versus non-physical injury distinction, but have looked to 
incidents or risks of the employment and defmitions of terms such as 
"accident," "arising out of," and "in the course of' to detertnine 
whether to allo\v a tort action.272 Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court 
relied on the broader public policy against sexual harassment in over-
ruling Schwartz and Brown and finding that sexual harassment \Vas 
not meant to be covered by the Workers' Compensation Act.273 In 
Byrd, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished the battery involved in 
sexual harassment cases from that in other cases and found that bat-
tery in sexual harassment cases usually does not involve lost \Vages 
or physical injury, but rather unlawful disregard of personal rights.274 
In the concurring opinion, Judge Grimes quoted Larson275 and stated 
that it was important to focus on whether the physical injury pro-
duced was the kind covered by the Workers' Compensation Act, and 
not automatically bar a tort action based on the mere allegation of a 
267. Schwartz, 470 So. 2d at 722. 
268. Brown, 469 So. 2d at 159. 
269. Id. 
270. Id.; Schwartz, 410 So. 2d at 723. 
271. Brown, 469 So. 2d at 161 (Ervin, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
272. See, e.g., Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1100.01 (Fla. 
1989); Brown, 469 So. 2d at 158. 
273. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1102 (Fla. 1989). 
274. ld. at 1104 n.8. 
275. ld. at 1105 (Grimes, J., concurring and quoting Arthur Larson). See 2A LARSON, 
supra note 100, § 68.34(a). 
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battery. 276 
Florida is not alone in its difficulties regarding the compensabili-
ty of non-physical, mental injuries; jurisdictions differ as to the com-
pensability of mental injuries, depending on what caused the mental 
injury. Claims involving mental injuries fall into three categories: 1) a 
physical injury resulting from a mental stimulus, such as a stress-
induced heart attack; 2) a mental injury caused by a physical stimu-
lus, such as depression caused by the loss of a limb; and 3) a mental 
injury resulting from a mental stirnulus, such as post-traumatic stress 
disorder caused by witnessing a co-employee's death.277 Most juris-
dictions have no difficulty finding injuries in the first two categories 
compensable because the causation is easier to assess when the injury 
is accompanied by a physical itnpact or manifestation.278 In the third 
category, the jurisdictions do not agree. States, such as Florida, that 
do not compensate mental-mental clairns279 point to the difficulty of 
proving that the work caused the mental injury and to the speculative 
nature of mental injury as being incapable of measurement by any 
legal standard.280 Other states are willing to grant workers' compen-
sation to mental-mental claims despite the difficulty in formulating 
legal tests to prove that the work caused the injury; courts in these 
states find that the proof problems do not justify the denial of 
claims. 281 .. 
When the mental stimulus in a mental-mental claim is sudden or 
traumatic, courts are more likely to award benefits because such a 
mental stimulus, like a physical stimulus, can be pinpointed to a 
particular time and place. In cases of gradual or cumulative mental 
stimuli,282 three tests have emerged to detertnine work-connectedness. 
Under the unusual stress test, a mental injury is compensable if the 
mental injury was caused by exposure to "unexpected, unusual, or 
extraordinary" stress greater than that experienced by the average 
276. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1105 (Grimes, J., concurring). 
277. These categories are commonly referred to as mental-physical, physical-mental, and 
mental-mental. See DONALD T. DECARLO & MARTIN M!NKOWITZ, WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
INSURANCE AND LAW PRACI1CB: THE NEXT GENERATION 229 (1989). See generally 1B 
LARsON, supra note 100, § 42.20-.23. 
278. 1B LARSON, supra note 100, § 42.23; David D. Thamann, Employee Mental Dis· 
ability Claims and Insurance, 17 N. KY. L. REv. 391, 393 (1990). 
279. City of Holmes Beach v. Grace, 598 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1992). 
280. Thamann, supra note 278, at 393. 
281. ld. at 393-94. 
282. See generally Glenn M. Troost, Comment, Workers' Compensation and Gradual 
Stress in the Workplace, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 847 (1985). 
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employee.283 A claimant in jurisdictions that use the second test, the 
objective causation test, need only establish a causal connection be-
tween the workplace and the mental injury to receive benefits.284 
The objective causation test is a two-part test. First, the claimant must 
prove that the stressful job conditions actually exist.285 Second, the 
claiinant must prove that employment conditions contributed more to 
the cause of the mental disorder than did non-employment condi-
tions.286 The third test, the subjective causal-nexus test, is rarely 
used because of its tendency to compensate mental injuries with the 
slimmest possible work connection.287 Under the subjective causal-
nexus test, compensation will be granted to a claimant whose subjec-
tive and honest impression is that the claimant is disabled. 288 
The objective causation test best meets the objective of workers' 
compensation schemes to cover all genuinely work-related injuries.289 
Jurisdictions relying on the unusual stress test probably do so in the 
belief that the unusualness will make causation easier to prove.290 
But the unusual stress test does not support the workers' compensa-
tion goal of broad coverage because it results in the denial of benefits 
to claimants who are predisposed to mental injury.291 Notwithstand-
ing the difficulty of proving the causation of mental injuries, the 
trend is toward recognizing that mental injury caused by stress is 
similar to physical injury caused by stress because no true distinction 
can be made between the two.292 The trend toward recognizing men-
tal-mental claims has led to more of those claims being ftled.293 One 
cotnmentator posits that workers' compensation claims for mental 
stress may have increased because of their publicity, the economic 
conditions of unemployment, and the increase in tort recoveries for 
283. Id. at 850, 851. 
284. Id. at 851-53; Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor, & Human Rela· 
tions, 240 N.W.2d 128, 130 {WIS. 1976). 
285. McGarrah v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp,, 675 P.2d 159, 17()..71 (Or. 1983). 
286. ld. at 171; see Troost, supra note 282, at 852-53. 
287. For a thorough discus,sion of the causal-nexus test and the compensability of mental 
injuries, see Deziel v. Difco Labs., 268 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1978). 
288. ld; see generally lB LARsON, supra note 100, § 42.23(d). 
289. See Troost, supra note 282, at 860-65. 
290. See DECARLO & MINKowrrz, supra note 277, at 286. 
291. See Troost, supra note 282, at 86()..61. 
292. See Thamann, supra note 278, at 394. The author, citing NPS Corp. v. Insurance 
Co. of N. Am., 511 A.2d 1211 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), concludes that mental inju-
ry is just as real as physical injury and just as capable of being evaluated. ld. 
293. DECARLO & MINKowrrz, supra note 277, at 230. Stress claims have more than 
doubled between 1980 and 1988. ld. at 279. 
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intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 294 Because 
cases of sexual harassment fit the mental-mental mold, many jurisdic-
tions that recognize mental-mental clahns as compensable deny tort 
suits based on sexual harassment. Conversely, jurisdictions that do not 
find mental-mental clai1ns compensable are more apt to allow tort 
suits based on sexual harassment.295 After considering the issue, 
most employers would probably rather handle mental-mental clailns 
through the workers' compensation system than risk large verdicts in 
tort actions. 296 
The assertion that jurisdictions recognizing mental-mental claitns 
must then logically bar tort clahns based on sexual harassment is 
erroneous. A rational basis exists for allowing both. Oregon and 
Michigan have allowed both claims. In 1983, the Oregon Supreme 
Court adopted a two-part objective causation test in recognizing a 
mental-mental claitn brought by an employee who was subjected to 
public reprin1ands and demotion in spite of a high seniority level.297 
Under the two-part objective causation test, mental-mental clailnants 
in Oregon must prove that conditions stressful to an average worker 
actually existed,298 and that the employment conditions were the ma-
jor contributing cause of the mental injury.299 The Oregon legislature 
refined the supreme court's objective causation test with a four-part 
test in 1987.300 
Notwithstanding Oregon's recognition of mental-mental workers' 
compensation claitns, the court of appeals allowed a pharmacy clerk 
to bring an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
against her employer for verbal sexual harassment by her supervi-
sor.301 The court did not analyze her mental-mental claims as being 
limited to workers' compensation benefits. In fact, the court held that 
294. ld. at 280. 
295. 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, § 68.34(d). 
296. DECARLO & MINKowrrz, supra note 277. at 230. 
297. McGarrah v. State Accident & Ins. Fund Corp., 675 P.2d 159 (Or. 1983). 
298. ld. at 171. 
299. Id. 
300. The Oregon legislature amended its definition of occupational disease to include 
mental disorders that meet the following four tests: (1) the stressful employment conditions 
must objectively exist; (2) the stressful employment conditions must be different than condi-
tions inherent in every workplace and do not include reasonable personnel actions; (3) the 
employee must be diagnosed with a mental or emotional disorder that is generally recognized 
in the medical or psychological community; and ( 4) there must be clear and convincing evi-
dence that the mental disorder arose out of and in the course of employment OR. REv. 
STAT. § 656.802(3) (1991). 
301. Palmer v. Bi-Mart Co., 758 P.2d 888 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). 
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the plaintiffs receipt of workers' compensation benefits based on the 
sexually harassing acts did not prevent her common law claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.302 Instead of using the 
mental-mental nature of her clairn to bar her common law suit under 
the exclusive remedy rule, the court found an intentional tort excep-
tion because the employer had failed to stop the supervisor's harass-
ment once the employer was notified. 303 
In another com1non law suit based on sexual harassment, in 
which the employee was ultbnately assaulted and raped by her super-
visor, the court stated that the type of injury does not determine 
compensability.304 The court found no causal link between the ha-
rassment and a risk of employment because it lacked evidence that 
the sexual harassment was work-related.305 The court therefore con-
cluded that the employer was not entitled to su1nmary judgment based 
on the exclusive remedy provision.306 However, the court affirmed 
sumrnary judgment for the employer because the evidence could not 
support the employee's theory of vicarious liability.3111 
Michigan is another state that both recognizes menb)).-mental 
workers' compensation claims and allows tort suits based on sex 
discritnination.308 The Michigan Supreme Court allowed a tort suit, 
which alleged violation of the state Fair Employment Practices 
Acf&J and the state Civil Rights Act,310 because these statutes were 
intended to promote a public policy distinct from that of workers' 
compensation.311 Rather than finding workers' compensation to be 
the plaintiff's exclusive remedy, the court allowed both workers' com-
pensation benefits and the tort suif12 because of the statutes' differ-
ent purposes. The court found that the purpose of the Workers' Com-
pensation Acf13 is to assist industrial injury victirns, while the Civil 
302. Id. at 890-92. 
303. Id. at 892. 
304. Carr v. U.S. West Direct Co., 779 ·p.2d 154, 157 n.S (Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
305. Id. at 156, 157. 
306. /d. at 157. 
307. /d. 
308. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 418.301(2) (West Supp. 1989); Greenwood v. Pontiac 
Bd. of Educ., 465 N.W.2d 36~ (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (applying the statutory objective cau-
sation test). 
309. MICH. COMP. LAws § 423.301 (repealed 1969). 
310. Elliott-Larson Civil Rights Act, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2101 (West 198S & 
Supp. 1992). 
311. Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 362 N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1984). 
312. ld. at 643. 
313. MICH. COMP. LAws § 418.131 (Supp. 1990). 
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Rights Acts address prejudices.314 The court adopted the Supreme 
Court's construction of Title Vll in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co.,315 holding that one statutory scheme should not be allowed to 
frustrate the purpose of another statutory scheme.316 
State civil rights statutes echo Title VII's strong public policy 
against racial discritnination and sexual discrimination, which includes 
sexual harassment.317 Upholding this public policy, therefore, is a le-
gitimate reason for allowing tort claitns based on sexual harassment 
to proceed even though the mental injuries may be compensable 
under the state workers' compensation scheme. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals further distinguished compensa-
ble mental injuries from mental injuries resulting from sexual harass-
ment in Slayton v. Michigan Host, Inc. 318 In Slayton, a fanner wait-
ress was allowed to bring her tort action under the Elliott-Larsen 
Civil Rights Act,319 \vhich allows compensatory da1nages for mental 
anguish resulting from employment discrimination, in addition to 
equitable relief.320 The for1ner waitress alleged that her required uni-
fortn of high-heeled shoes and a short skirt was discriminatory and 
subjected her to sexual harassment.321 The waitress and other female 
employees had sued the employer in federal court for sexual harass-
ment, and the action had been dismissed without prejudice.322 The 
plaintiff then brought suit in the state court, alleging gender discrimi-
nation and harassment because her employer forced her to quit her 
job in retaliation for her federal suit.323 The court found that tort law 
compensates for personal injury, and that workers' compensation 
compensates for disabilities resulting from personal injuries occurring 
during the course of employment.324 In other words, although the 
court allowed the tort suit, it found that some customary elements of 
da1nages in the tort suit may be barred by the exclusive remedy pro-
vision.325 
314. Boscaglia, 362 N.W.2d at 645. 
315. 415 u.s. 36, 48 (1974). 
316. Boscaglia, 362 N.W.2d at 645, 646. 
317. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e (1964) (Supp. n 1970). 
318. 332 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
319. Elliott-T.arsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 37.2101-.2804 (West 
1985 & Supp. 1992) (supersedes the Fair Employment Practices Act). 
320. Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act § 37.2803. 
321. Slayton, 332 N.\V.2d at 499. 
322. ld. 
323. ld. 
324. ld. 
325. /d. 
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In distinguishing claims for mental suffering because of discrimi-
nation from claims for mental injury as the resulting disability, the 
court stated that the resulting mental disability would be compensable, 
but that the mental suffering does not merge with the resulting mental 
disability.326 To explain its decision, the court pointed to the source 
of the injury.327 The court stated that mental injuries resulting from 
compensable sources should not be confused with mental injuries 
resulting from sex discrimination.328 Mental disability caused by gen-
eral stress in the workplace is compensable, but mental injury based 
on sexual discritnination is not compensable because its source is the 
"deliberate or inadvertent disregard by the employer of the fundamen-
tal rights of his employees."329 Because the mental injuries flowing 
from the discrimination were independent of any resulting disability 
that might be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, the 
court allowed the tort suit.330 
In states with civil rights statutes that do not provide compensa-
tory damages, plaintiffs will need to use conunon law tort claims. 
The same policy reasons that the Michigan Court of Appeals used to 
allow statute-based sex discri1nination suits support common law tort 
suits based on sexual discritnination and sexual harassment. 
Florida is one of the few states whose statute addresses the com-
pensability of mental injuries resulting from mental stirnuli. The Flori-
da statute states that "[a] mental or nervous injury due to stress, 
fright or excitement only . . . shall be deemed not to be an injury by 
accident arising out of the employment.,331 Although under its stat-
ute Florida finds only mental injuries that result from physical trauma 
compensable, the physical trauma requirements have been stretched to 
allow compensation for mental injuries caused by a physical trauma 
with n1inor physical consequences. In Watson v. Melman, Inc., a 
seamstress was accidentally struck behind the ear with a cardboard 
spool weighing eight and one-half ounces.331 Although her skin was 
only bruised and she was not disabled, she claimed benefits for a 
neurosis that developed because the incident reminded her of her son 
326. ld. 
327. Id. 
328. ld. 
329. Id. (quoting Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999. 1000 (E.D. Mich. 
1979)). 
330. ld. 
331. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(1) (West 1991). 
332. Watson v. Melman. Inc., 106 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), cert. de· 
nied, 111 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1959). 
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who had died from a blow to the head.333 The innocuous blow pro-
vided the court with the physical trau1na necessary to make the award 
for the mental injury.334 Such strained reasoning would not be neces-
sary if the focus was on the work connection rather than on the type 
of trauma that caused the mental injury. 
The Florida District Court of Appeals used similar reasoning to 
bar the tort suits based on sexual harassment in Schwartt35 and 
Brown. 336 The batteries or unwanted touchings in these sexual ha-
rassment cases did not cause any compensable physical injury, but de-
spite the lack of remedies available under the workers' compensation 
statute the court held the statute to be the plaintiffs' exclusive reme-
dy.337 Using the rationale of the court of appeals in Schwartz and 
Brown, sexual harassment suits would be barred or allowed depending 
on whether physical touching was involved. In Byrd, the Florida 
Supreme Court elirninated the possibility of anomalous results by 
focusing on the distinct public policies behind workers' compensation 
laws and sex discrimination laws.338 Making broader inquiries that 
focus on the fundamental policies behind these laws assures more 
equitable and consistent treatment of sexual harassment victiJns. 
Even though Florida, by statute, does not compensate mental 
claitns based on sexual harassment,339 coverage for many physical-
mental claitns is, in effect, coverage for mental-mental claims. The 
general rule that a jurisdiction that recognizes mental-mental claitns 
must logically deny tort suits based on sexual harassment is unfound-
ed because of the strong public policy against sexual harassment and 
because sexual harassment is outside the scope of workers' compen-
sation systems.340 In fact, the Florida District Court of Appeals 
found that the Florida Supreme Court made it clear that benefits for 
mental-mental clairns and tort suits based on sexual harassment are 
not mutually exclusive.341 In Ramada Inn Surfside v. Swanson, a fe-
male hotel employee clainted workers' compensation benefits for 
333. ld. 
334. Jd. 
335. Schwartz v. Zippy Mart, Inc., 470 So. 2d 720 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1985), overruled 
by Byrd v. Richardson..<Jreensbields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989). 
336. Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 469 So. 2d ISS (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1985), 
overruled by Byrd v. Richardson..<Jreenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989). 
337. Schwartz, 470 So. 2d at 724; Brown, 469 So. 2d at 159. 
338. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1099. 
339. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(1) (West 1991). 
340. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1099. 
341. Ramada Inn Surfside v. Swanson, 560 So. 2d 300 (Fla. Ct App. 1990). 
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unwanted sexual contacts, including intercourse, with her supervi-
sor.342 The court of appeals found that awarding the plaintiff benefits 
was entirely consistent with Byrd.343 The court stated that in certain 
cases plaintiffs can pursue separate claims for "qualitatively different 
injuries."344 
In jurisdictions that bar compensation for mental-mental injuries, 
plaintiffs face a diletnma because alleging that physical manifestations 
accompany the. emotional injury will strengthen the damages in a tort 
suit, but that sarne allegation may cause the tort suit to be barred by 
the exclusive remedy rule. Focusing on the nature of the injury caus-
es conflicting court decisions because compensation is granted for 
intentional physical injury but not for intentional mental injury. This 
focus also results in conflicting decisions regarding the barring of tort 
suits under the exclusive remedy rule. When using a nature-of-the-
injury test, courts ignore the employer's conduct and allow the em-
ployer to use the exclusive remedy provision as a shield to avoid 
liability for intentional acts. 
lnst~ad of looking at the compensable nature of the injury, Mich-
igan courts look to the theory underlying the proposed civil action to 
decide whether to allow a civil suit. 345 The Michigan courts have 
found that the public policy underlying tort actions brought pursuant 
to the state civil rights act were based on a public policy distinct 
from the policies furthered by the workers' compensation act.346 The 
Florida Supreme Court used the Michigan courts' analysis to look at 
the theory or public policy underlying tort suits based on sexual 
harassment, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress.347 
Other states should follow Michigan's and Florida's lead and focus 
on the conduct of the employer and the theory underlying the claim. 
This focus will produce more consistent and equitable results, while 
holding intact the general rule of exclusiveness of the workers' com-
pensation remedy. 
342. ld. 
343. Id. at 304. 
344. ld. 
345. Boscaglia v. Micbigan Bell Tel. Co., 362 N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1983); Slayton v. 
Michigan Host Inc., 332 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. CL App. 1983) .. 
346. Boscaglia, 362 N.W.2d at 645; Slayton, 332 N.W.2d at 500; Moll v. Parkside 
Livonia Credit Union. 525 F .. Supp. 786 (B.D .. Mich. 1981); Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 
F. Supp. 999 (B.D. Mich. 1979). 
347. Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 1989). 
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VTII. SEXUAL SMENT AS OUTSIDE THR SCOPE OF THR 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION SCHEME 
As shown in the preceding section, courts that rely on the physi-
cal or non-physical nature of the injury to deter1nine compensability 
make conflicting decisions.348 In addition, the argument that if men-
tal-mental claitns are compensable, then sexual harassment tort suits 
should be barred is unsound because the intentional nature of sexual 
harassment and the strong public policy against it place sexual ha-
rassment outside the scope of the workers' compensation system. 
Workers' compensation schemes are meant to compensate workers 
injured by an accident "arising out of' and "in the course'' of em-
ployment and caused by a "normal risk or incident" of that employ-
ment. Therefore, focusing on the definitions of these tem1s, the con-
duct of the employer, and the theory underlying the sexual harassment 
clahn should lead to more consistent and equitable results. 
A. Sexual Harassment Is Not an Accident 
Most states' workers' compensation statutes use the term "acci-
dent" to refer to a worker's injury, and this tertn creates interpretation 
problems for the courts .. 349 A popular definition of accident is "an 
unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or 
designed."350 Courts look for four elements to detennine whether an 
accident occurred: unexpected cause, unexpected result, definite time 
of the event, and definite tirne of the resulting injury.351 All these 
elements are rarely present, so most courts will find that an accident 
occurred if its cause was unexpected or its result was unexpected.352 
This definition of accident is worrisome because courts have 
used it to find sexual harassment accidental. 353 Taking the 
employee's viewpoint, a court may find that the intentional act of 
sexual harassment was accidental because the employee did not ex-
348. See supra notes 232-347 and accompanying text 
349. 1A LARsON, supra note 100, § 37.10 (the tenn .. accident" has been adopted in all 
but nine states). 
350. I d. § 37 .00. 
351. ld. § 37.20. 
352. ld. 
353. See, e.g., Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 1986); Fields 
v. • Employees Fed. Credit Union, 540 N.B.2d 631, 634-35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). 
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pect it to occur.354 However, where there is a pattern of sexual ha-
rassment in the workplace, a court should have difficulty fmding that 
emotional injury was unexpected by the employee. Additionally, the 
intentional nature of sexual harassment renders it an expected cause 
of injury rather than unexpected.355 Therefore, sexual harassment is 
not an accident and is outside the workers' compensation scheme. 
B. Sexual Harassment Does Not Occur During the 
Course of Employment 
In determining whether the "course" requirement of the compen-
sability test has been met, courts consider the factors of time, place, 
and activity.356 Sexual harassment that occurs outside the work peri-
od or off the employer's premises does not occur during the course 
of employment. The activity factor is less clear cut. Because of the 
broad coverage policy of workers' compensation, where employees' 
activities such as rescuing or using a different method to complete a 
task have benefitted the employer, courts have liberally construed the 
activity to be during the course of employment.357 Sexual harassment 
activity does not enhance work perfor1nance or benefit the employer 
in any way. Moreover, in cases of sexual harassment, analyzing the 
employer's activity and motive along with the employee's activity and 
motive is also a proper focus in determining whether the course ele-
• ment ts met. 
Sexual harassment activity is intentional, and the motive is per-
sonal. As with other intentional torts, se.xual harassment severs the 
employment relationship, and the course requirement cannot be 
. 354. Zabkowicz, 789 F.2d at 545 
355. See KARON E. PER.KINS-Slmll, INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM: 
HARAsSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE. BSYOND nn.n VII: ADDmONAL CAUSES OF AcnoN AND 
REMEDIES IN SEXUAL HARAssMENTS (1992) citing Eddy v. Wickes Corp., No. IP 83-857-C 
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 20, 1985) .. The court in Eddy found, in an order denying a motion to dis-
miss, that continuing sexual assaults: 
at some point lost their "unexpected, random and single ,occasion" characteristic, 
thereby ceasing to become ''accidental" in the meaning of the IWCA • • • • Thus, 
once a pattern of abuse had been firmly established, the resultant injuries and 
correlative personal injury clajms no longer fell within the Industrial Board's exclu-
sive jurisdiction. but became compensable by this Court. 
I d. at 556-51. 
356. Professor !..arson states, "An injmy is said to arise in the course of the employment 
when it takes place within the period of the employment. at a place where the employee 
reasonably may be, and, while he is fulfilling bis duties or engaged in doing something inci-
dental thereto." 1 LARsoN, supra note 100, § 14.00. 
357. See generally IA LARsON, supra note 100, §§ 20.()()..29.00. 
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met.358 Courts that have looked behind the intentional acts to see if 
the motivation was work-related have reached inconsistent results.359 
To refuse to see the intentional act of sexual harassment as occurring 
outside the course of employment allo\vs the harassment to continue 
and shields employers from taking responsibility for preventing sexual 
harassment in the workplace. 
C. Sexual Harassment Does Not Arise out of the Employment 
The "arising" element of the compensability test requires that 
there be a causal relationship between the injury and the employ-
ment.360 Causation exists when the injury arises out of a risk that a 
reasonably prudent person would understand as an incident of the 
employment. 361 Most courts have used the increased risk test to de-
terinine whether the arising element is satisfied.362 Under the in-
creased risk test, the risk must be incidental to the employment in an 
amount greater than that faced by the general public.363 Most juris-
dictions hold that assault cases arise out of the employment when, in 
the normal friction and strain of the workplace, arguments develop in 
connection with the work being done.3M These types of disputes and 
their consequences can be said to be incidents or increased risks of 
the employment.365 
Sexual harassment is not an increased risk of employment. Wom-
en may be exposed to sexual harassment in public, at home, or at 
work. There is no increased risk of sexual harassment on the job. 
Sexual harassment is typically the result of purely personal motiva-
tions and is usually not related to a dispute about work. A causal 
connection between the harassment injury and the employment is 
358. 2A LARsON, supra note 100, § 68.11. 
359. See, e.g., Alpine Roofing Co. v. Dalton, 539 P.2d 487 (Colo. CL App. 1975) (bar-
ring tort suit because assaults by foreman after a work-related dispute and firing was consid-
ered work-related and within the course of employment); Smith v. I.annert, 429 S.W.2d 8 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (allowing plaintiff to sue in tort for spanking given while taking an 
unauthorized rest break because taking the break removed the plaintiff from her scope of 
employment). See generally Kawalar, supra note 78, at 190-94 (discussing sexual harassment 
in tenns of the workers' compensation compensability test). 
360. 1 LARSON, supra note 100, § 6.00. 
361. Bowling v. Fountain County Highway Dep'~ 428 N.E.2d 80, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1981) (quoting St. Estey Piano Corp. v. Steffe~ 328 N.E.2d 240, 243 (Ind. Ct App. 1975)). 
362. 1 LARsON, supra note 100, §§ 6.00, 6.30. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. § 11.12(b). 
365. Id. § 11.00. 
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tenuous, at best.366 In applying the increased risk test to cases of 
sexual harassment, the courts should find that the harassment did not 
arise out of the employment.367 
Injuries caused by sexual harassment do not meet any of the 
three tests of compensability: sexual harassment is not an accident, it 
does not occur during the course of employment, nor does it arise out 
of the employment. Therefore, sexual harassment is outside the scope 
of the workers' compensation scheme. 
D. Sexual Harassment Is Outside the Contemplation of the 
Workers' Compensation System 
The ·right to employment free from sexual harassment is as much 
a civil right as is the right to employment free from racial discrim-
ination.368 The California Court of Appeals' fmding in Renteria that 
intentional racial harassment is in a "class of civil wrongs outside the 
contemplation of the workers' compensation system"369 applies 
equally to sexual harassment.370 As with racial discrimination, sexual 
harassment is intolerable in view of the great strides made by the 
women's movement and the public policy evidenced in recent federal 
and state legislative enactments. The distinct policies behind workers' 
compensation statutes and employment discrimination statutes require 
that sexual harassment injuries be viewed differently from workers' 
compensation injuries.371 To allow sexual harassment injuries to be 
366. A minority of jurisdictions use a liberal positional risk test to compensate injuries 
resulting from personal risks. Under the positional risk test, the injury arises out of the em-
ployment when the employment brings the employee to the zone of danger. This test is 
rejected by most jurisdictions as allowing compensation when the work connection is mini· 
mal. 1 LARsON, supra note 100_ §6.50; see also B. SMALL. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
LAW OP INDIANA, § 6.8 at 128·30 (1950). 
367. Murphy v. ARA Servs., Inc., 298 S.E.2d 528 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that 
sexual harassment by a supervisor during the work day did not arise out of the employment 
because the risk was not peculiar to the work and did not arise out of the character of the 
position). 
368. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e~1 to 2{)()()e-17 (1988). 
369. Renteria v. County of Orange, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447, 451 (CL App. 1978). 
370. Although the Indiana Court of Appeals for the Fll'St District was willing to find that 
racial harassment is an intentional tort meriting an exception to the exclusivity provision, the 
Fourth District was not willing -to characterize sexual harassment as an intentional tort. Perry, 
604 N.E.2d at 617 (allowing a tort suit based on racial harassment); Fields, 540 N.E.2d at 
635 (barring a tort action based on sexual harassment). Instead, the Fourth District held that 
sexual harassment was a compensable "accident" Fields, 540 N.B.2d at 635. 
371. Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (B.D. Mich. 1979) (noting that 
the goal of workers' compensation is ''to redress 'industrial injuries'," and that the goal of 
fair employment laws "is to guarantee equal opportunity in the marketplace • • • ") • 
• 
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compensable only under the workers; compensation system would not 
give effect to the strong public policy against sexual harassment and 
other employment discrimination. Workers' compensation benefits do 
not provide a si . · cant remedy for sexual harassment because most 
harassment injuries will not result in any disability for which benefits 
are offered. 
Courts that have barred tort suits for sexual harassment have 
done so to avoid destroying the historic legislative bargain of giving 
up the right to sue in tort in return for a guarantee of compensation 
regardless of fault.372 These courts view the right to sue as an essen-
tial concession that must be kept intact to preserve the balance of the 
workers' compensation system.373 These courts would defer to the 
legislature for any needed reform.374 
Because of the difficulty in ascertaining the original legislative 
intent behind the workers' compensation systems, which were enacted 
between 1910 and 1930, courts need not rigidly impose the original 
quid pro quo agreement. Such blind adherence to the original bargain 
does not take into account the many changes that have occurred in 
society and public policies, including the large-scale pal'ticipation of 
women in the workforce and civil rights legislation. Furthermore, 
scholars disagree as to the original legislative purposes in enacting 
workers' compensation systems. Some scholars believe that the right 
to sue at common law was insignificant compared to the protection 
no-fault compensation would afford to workers?75 Other scholars be-
lieve that employers made the bargain to protect themselves from the 
likelihood that tort liability would become easier to prove.376 
The value of the right to sue at comrnon law has substantially 
increased since the bargain was struck early in this century. At the 
time workers' compensation systems were enacted, the comJnon law 
defenses of contributory negligence, assu1nption of risk, and the fel-
. . 
372. See, e.g., Kofron v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 441 A.2d 226, 231 (Del. 1982) (inten-
tional tort); Burkhart v. Wells Elecs. Corp., 215 N .. E.2d 879, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (inten-
tional tort). 
373. See, e.g .. , Kofron, 441 A.2d at 231; Burkhart, 215 N.B.2d at 881. 
374. See, e.g., Kofron, 441 A.2d at 231; Burkhart; 215 N.B.2d at 881. 
375. See, e.g., Philips, The Relationship Between the Tort System and Workers' Compen-
sation The True Cost, in CONFBRBNCB ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORKPLACE LTA-
Bn.:rN, fmal edited proceedings at 87-88 (1981). 
376. See N. AsHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE 389 (1976); see also Note, Exceptions 
to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REv. 
1641, 1655 (1983). 
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low servant rule made the likelihood of success of a tort suit slim.377 
Legal developments such as strict liability for defective products,318 
the easier standard of proof for negligence,379 elimination of the fel-
low servant rule/80 and the adoption of comparative negligence381 
have increased the value of the right to sue at conunon law, render-
ing the quid pro quo unacceptable in some cases. Therefore, creating 
exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule that reflect legal and societal 
change is appropriate. 
Sexual harassment was probably never contemplated by the origi-
nal authors of workers' compensation systems because \Vomen did not 
have a strong presence in the workplace. Furthermore, public policy 
against sexual discrimination had not been formulated and translated 
into statutory law. Therefore, sexual harassment is completely outside 
the contemplation of the workers' compensation scheme, and employ-
ers should not be allowed to use the exclusive remedy provision as a 
shield to avoid liability for permitting sexual harassment to occur in 
the workplace. 
IX. EMPLOYER LIABILI1'Y FOR SEXUAL 
If public policy favors eli1ninating sexual harassment from the 
workplace, then employers, who are in a position to prevent sexual 
harassment, must be held accountable. Usually, victims of workplace 
sexual harassment face no difficulty in suing the co-employees re-
sponsible.382 Even though victi1ns can bring clahns against co-em-
ployees, co-employees may be unable to pay the damages awarded. 
377. See supra notes 100-1.06 and accompanying text. 
378. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402a (1965) (employers could be held strictly 
liable for modifying materials used in the workplace). See generally Note, supra note 376, at 
1644-45. 
379. Robert H. Ashford & William G. Johnson, Negligence vs. No-Fault liability: An 
Analysis of the Workers' Compensation Example, 12 SEroN HALL L. R.Bv. 725, 733-35 
(1982) .("[R]ecent plaintiff-oriented developments in tort law have led some commentators to 
suggest that the 'compromise' struck by the shared liability of workers• compensation should 
be reassessed. These include developments relating to • • • res ipsa loquitor, the rejection of 
custom as controlling in detenuining standards of care •••• "). See generally Note, supra 
note 376. 
380. See Note, supra note 376, at 1645 n.29. 
381. For a discussion of the value of the right to sue in tort see Note, supra note 376. 
382. Popovich v. lrlando, 811 P.2d 379 (Colo .. 1991) (allowing a claim against a co-em-
ployee for intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from sexual harassment, in 
addition to workers' compensation benefits); O'Connell v. Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349 (Mass. 
1987) (allowing claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
against a co-employee). 
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Furthem1ore, judgments against co-employees do not deter employers 
from pertnitting sexual harassment in the workplace. Unfortunately, 
because of the intentional act necessary to bring suit in most states, 
many employers are able to insulate themselves from liability for 
sexual harassment inflicted by their employees.383 
As with employer liability in Title VII claims, liability in tort 
claims is difficult to prove using agency principles. Only when sexual 
harassment is seen as being outside the contemplation of the workers' 
compensation system and when the employment is seen as providing 
the apparent authority or opportunity for sexual harassment to occur 
will more courts place liability on employers. Presently, employers are 
chiefly found liable because of their own action or inaction when the 
possibility of sexual harassment is brought to their attention. 
Lawsuits against employers for their own intentional acts are 
generally allowed as exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision384 
because an intentional act cannot be accidental.385 However, sexual 
harassment is usually carried out by a co-employee, and the majority 
of jurisdictions will not allow suits against the employer when neither 
the employ~r nor its alter-ego comtnitted the sexual barassment.386 
Courts that do not impose liability on employers for their supervisors' 
sexual harassment state that the employers' liability is derivative, and 
therefore not intentional.387 
Jurisdictions that must find an intentional tort exception to allow 
a suit against the employer have allowed claims of assault and battery 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but have not allowed 
claims of negligent hiring or retention. For example, a federal district 
court in New Jersey disallowed a claim against the employer for 
negligent hiring, but allowed claitns of battery and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress based on the satne act of sexual harassment 
under the statute's exception for intentional wrongs.388 In Cremen, a 
383. Fields v. Cummins Employees Fed. Credit Union, 540 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1989) (allowing a claim against a supervisor for sexual harassment and barring a similar suit 
against the employer). 
384. 2A LARsON, supra note 100. § 68.00. 
385. ld. 
386. ld. at § 68.21 & n.24. 
387. See, e.g., Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 798 (N~D. 
DI. 1990) (denying employer liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior); Bailey v. 
Unocal Corp., 700 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. m. 1988) (barring suit because any liability of the 
employer who did not investigate was only derivative and, therefore, barred by the exclusive 
remedy provision). See generally 2A LARsoN, supra note 100, § 68.00. 
388. Cremen v. Harrah's Marina Hotel Casino, 680 F. Supp. 150 (D.NJ. 1988). 
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supervisor sexually assaulted a casino cocktail server in the 
supervisor's office at the end of the workday.389 Although the cock-
tail server filed a verbal complaint with her employer's affnmative 
action officer the day after the assault, she continue,d to be harassed 
until she got her union involved.390 After determining that the 
employee's injuries resulting from the sexual assault were compensa-
ble under the workers' compensation act, the court went on to deter-
mine whether workers' compensation was her exclusive remedy.391 
Because New Jersey law makes an exception to the exclusive remedy 
provision only for intentional wrongs, the plaintiffs claims of negli-
gent hiring and retention were dismissed.392 The court then proceed-
ed to determine whether the plaintiff's claims of battery and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress should be allowed.393 
In making its determination, the federal court applied the sub-
stantial certainty test as adopted by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court.394 In Millison, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the 
legislature could not have intended that employers escape liability for 
all willful misconduct falling, short of intentional assault and 
battery.395 On the other hand, not wanting the exception for inten-
tional wrongs to swallow the rule, the court, in applying the substan-
tial certainty test, demanded virtual certainty that any complained of 
hartn had occulTed because of the employer's actions .. 396 In. addition 
to the substantial certainty test, the New Jersey Supreme Court ·re-
quired that the context of the act be examined .. 397 In applying the 
context test, the court looked at the resulting injury and the circum-
stances surrounding it to see if the injury was "a fact of life of indus-
trial employment" or beyond the type of injuries that the legislature 
contemplated when enacting workers' compensation as the exclusive 
remedy for work-related injuries .. 398 
Applying the supreme court's two-prong test, the federal district 
court agreed with other courts that could not accept sexual harassment 
389. Id. at 152. 
390. ld. 
391. Id. at 155. 
392. Id. at 155-56. 
. . 
393. ld. at 156-59. 
394. Id. at 157 (citing Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d SOS. 514 
(NJ. 1985)). 
395.. Millison, 501 A.2d at 513 •. 
396. ld. at 514. 
397. It.!. 
398. ld. 
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as "a fact of life of industrial employment.,399 The court pointed out 
the importance of the context test by explaining that the quid pro quo 
breaks down when a risk that is not inherent in the employment is 
the cause of the injuries.400 Following this logic, the court held that 
sexual harassment is not the type of injury that the legislature had 
contemplated as being limited to the remedy of workers' compensa-
tion.401 In addition, the court held that a jury could find that the 
plaintiffs sexual assault and harassment rose to the level of intention-
al wrongs under the substantial certainty test and refused to grant 
sun1111ary judgment to the employer.402 
In addition to holding an employer vicariously liable for the 
intentional acts of a supervisor, the Arizona Supreme Court has held 
an employer directly liable for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress when it refused to investigate despite numerous com-
plaints.403 The court found that this conduct was extreme or outra-
geous as defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46, 
COIDtnent (d).4Gt 
Because sexual harassment was totally outside the contemplation 
of the legislatures in enacting a workers' compensation system, the 
rules of that system should have no influence on whether a tort claim 
based on sexual harassment is allowed against an employer. Indeed, 
the context test used in Cremen indicates that the workers' compensa-
tion law should not govern events of sexual harassment in the 
workplace. The breakdown of the quid pro quo rationale used by the 
court in Cremen to allow intentional tort claims applies with equal 
force to negligently pennitted sexual harassment. As part of the origi-
nal bargain, legislators agreed that consumers should pay the price 
necessary to obtain the product they desired. That price included the 
399. Cremen, 680 F. Supp. at 159 (citing 'Lui v. Intercontinental Hotels Corp., 634 
F. Supp. 684, 686--87 (D. Haw. 1986); Pryor v. United States Gypsum Co., 585 F. Supp. 
311, 316 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Bennett v. Purr's Cafeterias, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 887, 890 (D. 
Colo. 1982)). 
400. Id. 
401. ld. 
402. ld. at 158-59; accord Palmer v. Bi-Mart Co., 758 P.2d 888 (Or. Cl App. 1988) 
(holding that an employer who failed to stop harassment after being notified bad a deliberate 
intent to injure the employee). 
4t>3.. Ford v .. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585-86 (Ariz. 1987). 
404. Id. at 585. Comment (d) of the Restatement states that there is liability "where the 
conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community • • • in which • • • an average member of the community would • • • 
exclaim, 'Outrageous!'" REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). 
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inevitable industrial injuries that would occur in producing the prod-
uct. However, sexual harassment is not an injury that is necessarily 
incurred to produce a consumer product. Therefore, sexual harassment 
• 
was not part of the quid pro quo agreement, and employers should 
not be allowed to use the exclusive remedy element of the quid pro 
quo to avoid their responsibility to rid the \Vorkplace of sexual ha-
rassment, even negligently allowed sexual harassment. 
When workers' compensation and sexual harassment based claims 
are seen as distinct, courts have no problem recognizing tort claims 
based on both intent and negligence.40S The tort of negligent hiring 
or retention is most successful against employers because it is based 
on direct liability rather than vicarious Iiability.406 In negligent hiring 
or retention cases, the jury detennines whether the employer knew or 
should have known of the sexual harassment and either ignored or 
otherwise ineffectively dealt with it.407 Because negligent hiring or 
retention clai1ns are based on direct rather than vicarious liability, 
whether or not the act of sexual harassment was outside the scope of 
the employee's employment is irrelevant..ms Thus, the conunon no-
tion that sexual harassment is virtually never within the scope of 
employment does not hatnper finding an employer directly liable. 
Besides the rationale that sexual harassment is outside the cover-
age of the workers' compensation scheme, courts have relie,d on the 
405. Seej e"g.~ Murphy v. ARA Servs.,, 'Inc., 298 S.E.2d 528 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (allow-
ing a tort suit against dte employer for negligent hiring and retention by reasoning that 
claims based on sexual harassment are not within the purview of the workers' compensation 
act); accord Cox v. Brazo, 303 S.B.2d 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 
575 N.E.2d ,428 (Ohio 1991). 
406. Ford, 734 P.2d at 580; Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1099; Cox, 303 S.E.2d at 71; Murphy, 
298 S.E.2d at 528; Hogan, 340 S.E.2d at 116; Kercw, 575 N.B.2d at 428. 
407. The Restatement (Second] of Torts states: 
A master is -under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant 
while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from inten-
-tionally banning others or from so conducting himself as to ,create an unreasonable 
.risk of bodily harm to them, if 
(a) the servant 
(i) is upon the premises in possession of tbe master or upon which the ser-
vant is privileged to enter only as his setvant, or 
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and 
(b) the master 
(i) knows or bas reason to know that he has the ability to control his ser-
vant, and 
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising 
such control. 
RBSTATEMBNT (SECOND) OP TORTS :§ 317 (1965). 
408. ld. 
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public policy of Title VII and similar state statutes against sexual 
harassment in allowing tort suits against employers based on sexual 
harassment.409 Further, these courts have cited with approval the use 
of agency principles,410 1nandated by the Supreme Court in 
Meritor411 to determine employer liability.411 Using agency princi-
ples to find employers vicariously liable for harassment by their em-
ployees in sexual harassment claims based on either statutory or tort 
law has met with lhnited success.413 Finding the employer vicari-
ously liable is problematic because under agency principles, the mas-
ter is liable .only for the servant's torts that are com•nitted within the 
scope of employment.414 Many courts decide that the act of sexual 
harassment can never benefit the employer and, therefore, the act is 
committed outside the scope of employment, and the employer cannot 
be held liable.415 
However, employers may be liable for the employees' torts com-
mitted outside the scope of their employment under an exception 
listed in the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 219.416 Em-
409. See Byrd v. Ricbardson.Qreenshields Sec •• Inc., SS2 So. 2d 1099, 1102-04 (Fl~ 
1989); Kerans, 515. N.E.2d at 435. 
410. For a detailed discussion of the problems with using agency principles to detennine 
employer liability under Title Vll, see Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment lia-
bility Under Agency Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FS:B v. Vinson, 44 
VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1991). 
411. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
412. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1103; Kerans, 515 N.B.2d at 432. 
413. See, e.g., Miller v .. Lindenwood Female College, 616 F. Supp. 860 (B.D. Mo. 1985) 
(holding that the college was not vicariously liable for the sexually harassing acts of its agent 
' . . 
because the agent was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the act); 
Cox v. Brazo, 303 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that a supervisor's harassing 
acts were not in furtherance of the employer's business and therefore not within the scope of 
employment so as to impose vicarious liability on the employer); Carr v. U S West Direct 
Co., 779 P.2d 154 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the employer was not vicariously liable 
for tm employee's harassing acts because they were not done within the scope of employ-
ment). 
414. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957). 
415. See, e.g., Cox, 303 S.E.2d at 73; Ca", 779 P.2d at 157. Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 228 defines tbe scope of employment as follows: 
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: 
(a) it is of the kind be is employed to perform; 
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; 
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve tbe master, and 
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of 
force is not unexpectable by the master. 
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is differeqt 
in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, 
or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP AGENCY § 228 (1957). 
416. The Restatement (Second) of Agency states: 
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players can be liable for employees' torts committed outside the 
scope of their employment if the employer intended the conduct or its 
consequences, or was negligent or reckless.417 Although courts hear-
ing tort claims based on sexual harassment have not invoked these 
portions of the Restatement, these exceptions support the rationale 
courts have used to find employers liable for negligent hiring, negli-
gent retention, and. intentional infliction of emotional distress.418 In 
holding employers vicariously liable under Title Vll, federal courts 
have used the exception in section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency to find an employer vicariously liable when an em-
ployee is assisted in canying out sexual harassment be,cause of the 
employee's authority or apparent authority, or because of the exis .. 
tence of the agency relationsbip.419 Although courts considering tort 
claitns based on sexual harassment have been divided on using the 
"apparent authority" exception,420 a general trend in tort law is to 
hold employers liable because the employment provided an opportuni-
ty for the tort to occur.421 This straining under agency principles to 
find employers liable for their employees' acts of harassment was 
predicted by Justice 'Rehnquist in his Meritor opinion when he recog-
nized that agency principles would not be totally transferable in sexu-
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting out-
side the scope of their employment, unless: 
(a) the master intended the conduct ot the consequences, or 
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or 
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or 
(d) the servant -purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and 
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accom-
plishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957). 
417. Id. § 219(2)(a)-(b). 
418. Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 235 Cal. Rptr~ 68 (Ct. App. 19-87); Hogan 
v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Palmer v. Bi-Mart Co., 
758 P.2d 888 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). 
419. Meritor Sav. B.ank v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Yates v. Avco Corp., 8'19 F.2d 
630 (6th Cir. 1987); Shrout v. Black Claussen Co., 689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ohio 19.88). 
420. Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 515 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ohio 1991) (holding that summary 
judgment was improperly granted to the employer). Contra Cox v. Brazo, 303 S.B.2<l 71, 73 
(Ga. Ct App. 1983) (denying employer liability based on respondeat superior because the al-
leged harassment did not further the employer's business); Carr v. U S West Direct Co., 779 
P.2d 154, 1S7 (Or. Ct App. 1989) (holding that .summary judgment was correctly granted to 
the employer because there were no facts showing that the employment was even remotely 
connected to the alleged harassment). 
42l. W. PAGB KlmroN ST AL., PROSSBR & KmrroN ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 507 
(Stb ed. 1984). 
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al harassment cases.422 Indeed, using agency principles may even 
hamper the enforcement of Title Vll and slow the elimination of 
sexual harassment from America's workplace. 
Courts have someti1nes confused agency principles with the 
workers' compensation test for coverage. Some courts have ruled that 
it is inconsistent to find a harasser's act to be within the scope of 
employment under agency principles, yet to find that the injuries were 
not suffered during the course of employment under the workers' 
• 
compensation system.423 These courts concl~de that there is an in-
consistency because they confuse scope of employment and course of 
employment. Although these concepts_ appear to represent s-imilar 
tests, the two tests serve entirely different purposes. When detertnin-
ing whether an injury occurred during the course of employment, 
courts are making inquiry as to the work-connectedness of the injury 
to confirm that the injury resulted from a hazard or risk that is inher-
ent in the employment, and therefore, one that the legislature had de--
signed the workers' compensation system to cover.424 The scope of 
employment test, which is an agency principle, is used to determine 
when an employer should be liable for the torts of its employee.425 
Therefore, a finding that sexual harassment did not occur during the 
course of employment for workers' compensation purposes, but that 
the harassment was comtnitted within the scope of employment ac-
cording to agency principles is not necessarily inconsistent. 
Employers should not be held strictly liable for sexual harass-
ment in the workplace, but public policy and statutory law require 
that employers use reasonable care to maintain a safe workplace.426 
When employers know or have reason to know that sexual harass-
ment is occurring in the workplace, they have a duty to undertake a 
prompt investigation and effectively e1hninate the harassment or faee 
liability for their inaction. Employers are in the best position to pre-
422. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
423. Sands v. Union Camp Corp., 559 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Miller v. 
Lindenwood Female College, 616 F. Supp. 860 (B.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that a finding that 
injuries sustained during the course of employment for purposes of vicarious liability but not 
for workers' compensation coverage was inconsistent). 
424. 1 LARsON, supra note 100, § 14.00. 
425. RFStATBMENT (SECOND) OP AGENCY § 219 (1) (1957). 
426. The purpose of both workers' compensation schemes and the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act is to assure that employers will maintain a safe workplace. 29 U.S.C. § 
6Sl(b) (1988). See generally Paul Raymond Gurtler, Commenlt The Workers' Compensation 
Principle: A Historical Abstract of the Nature of Workers' Compensation, 9 I. PUB. 
L & POL'Y 285 (1989). 
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vent sexual harassment in the workplace, and therefore the possibility 
of employers risking greater liability through tort actions would serve 
as an additional deterrent to the currently limited Title VII liability. 
The risk of liability should provide employers with the incentive to 
take positive steps to prevent sexual harassment. Preventative mea-
sures, such as policies against sexual harassment, grievance proce-
dures, and sen1inars, are key to eliminating sexual harassment from 
the workplace. Proper use of these policies and procedures, along 
with effective employer response to complaints of harassment, will 
not only help to eliminate sexual harassment from the workplace, but 
will ditninish employer liability. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Tort claims based on sexual harassment should be allowed as a 
means of redressing sexual harassment victims' individual rights. Tort 
clailns also serve an important role because they offer some advan-
tages that statutory claims do not. Employers should not be able to 
preclude these tort clai1ns by invoking the exclusive remedy provision 
of workers' compensation statutes, which were enacted at the tum of 
the century to compensate workers for industrial injuries. Using 
workers' compensation concepts shifts the focus from the employer's 
conduct and the theory underlying the claim to the nature of the 
injury, a focus that ignores the strong public policy against sexual 
harassment. The public policy against s·exual harassment along with 
the intentional nature of sexual harassment places sexual harassment 
outside the scope of workers' compensation. Plaintiffs' clai1ns for 
sexual harassment should be tried on the merits and not be automati-
cally barred by the workers' compensation system. 
Allowing tort claims based on sexual harassment would not 
result in strict liability for employers. The agency principles used to 
determine employer liability make it difficult to impose liability on 
employers for the harassing acts of their employees. However, the 
possibility of a tort action would serve as a deterrent and prompt 
employers to take steps to prevent sexual harassment, which is the 
ultilnate goal. 
Courts have reached conflicting results regarding the exclusive 
remedy defense because they view their roles in detertttining the 
legislative intent underlying workers' compensation statutes differently. 
Both the courts and potential plaintiffs need direction from state legis-
lators as to the relationship, if any, between workerst compensation 
and sexual harassment. Granted, sexual harassment is a politically 
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controversial issue, but it is demanding and receiving attention from 
the federal government, labor unions, employers, and the media. The 
time has come in the development of sexual harassment law for state 
legislators to cl · its relationship to workers' compensation. 
